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Abstract
Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought the level of expeditionary
contractors to historically unprecedented levels, altering the work composition for
military engineers. The alteration has shifted emphasis from technical knowledge areas
toward managerial knowledge associated with supervising the increased number of
contractors. This research utilizes System Dynamics modeling to analyze this shift in the
United States Air Force Civil Engineer officer career field and resulting transformative
effect on career field knowledge levels, both technical and managerial. The model is then
tested with multiple external policy adjustments in the areas of career field structure,
training, and operating policy.
Results indicate the shift from technical to managerial knowledge not only
diminishes technical knowledge, but also hinders managerial knowledge which requires a
strong technical foundation; this creates an overall degradation of both knowledge areas.
Therefore, the external policies implemented focused on limiting technical knowledge
loss. The recommended policy included a combination of additional technical training
and bifurcation of entry-level officers to focus on core technical knowledge,
simultaneously providing the foundation for successful managerial knowledge levels.
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KNOWLEDGE TRANSFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
CIVIL ENGINEER CAREER FIELD: A SYSTEM DYNAMICS APPROACH
I. Introduction

The United States Military, eighteen years into military operations in the Middle
East, is facing intense challenges in conducting 21st Century Irregular Warfare which
calls for not only a swift, precise conflict against a measured, indistinct enemy, but a
strong civil support role to rebuild nations (AFDD 3-2, 2007). A significant portion of
this civil support role falls under the responsibility of Civil Engineers, who must balance
this mission with traditional wartime engineering mission requirements (Brown, 2008).
To fulfill these missions, the military has dramatically increased utilization of contractors
in the expeditionary environment; now at historically unprecedented levels
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008).
Specifically, the United States Air Force Civil Engineer career field, the focus of
this research, has been called upon to fill regular Air Force rotations and additional
deployments for sister services who are unable to meet current requirements (Eulberg,
2009). With these requirements showing little sign of decline in the foreseeable future
(Eulberg, 2009) and operational tempos approaching unsustainable levels (AFPC, 2009),
many have begun to ask what adverse impacts will result. Studies have researched the
impact of a high operational tempo on areas such as health and morale (e.g. Rona, Fear,
Hull, Greenberg, Earnshaw, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2007) and turnover and retention (e.g.
Huffman, Adler, Dolan, & Castro, 2005); however, there is a gap in research exploring
operational tempo’s correlation to transformation of organizational knowledge base.
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Research Purpose
Due to the scale of the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, expeditionary
contractors are being utilized at unprecedented levels (Government Accountability
Office, 2008). This large number of contractors requires extensive oversight in the areas
of contract management, quality control and inspection, and auditing; activities which
correlate to an Engineering Manager occupation (O*NET, 2010). Previously military
engineers balanced both the technically-oriented Civil Engineer role and the
managerially-oriented Engineering Manager role. However, as the demand for military
engineers has increased and spurred the escalated employment of contractors, this
balance has shifted towards Engineering Management and the oversight functions it
entails. The purpose of this research, then, is to explore this “shift” of military engineers
away from technically oriented work towards managerial and the resulting transformation
it incurs on corresponding organizational knowledge base.
For this research, knowledge base is defined as the compilation of knowledge,
skills, and abilities that must be acquired to achieve a specific capability. Knowledge
base is attained through formal training and informal on-the-job training programs and
maintained through continued experience. Therefore, the shift away from technical work
alters the level of experience gained by military engineers and thus creates implications
on the organization’s technical capability, or technical knowledge base. Likewise, the
shift also impacts managerial capability, or management knowledge base. The combined
impact on technical and management knowledge bases comprises the transformation.
It is important to elucidate the differences and definitions of technical and
managerial knowledge bases. Technical knowledge base is defined by the knowledge,
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skills, and abilities commensurate with a professional Civil Engineer occupation. Typical
tasks associated with this include technical design, drafting, and inspecting (U.S.
Department of Labor, 2010a). Management knowledge base is defined by the
knowledge, skills and abilities commensurate with an Engineering Manager. The typical
tasks associated with this occupation include coordinating and directing projects,
interacting with clients, and performing administrative functions (U.S. Department of
Labor, 2010a). The relationship between the two knowledge areas could be considered
hierarchical; Engineering Managers are one step above Civil Engineers.

Research Objectives
Using these definitions of technical and managerial knowledge bases, this
research examines the changing nature of the military’s knowledge base and the
underlying causes contributing to it, including what has been called a reliance on
expeditionary contractor support (Singer, 2004; Congressional Budget Office, 2008;
Government Accountability Office, 2008). To do this, an understanding of the system in
which Air Force Civil Engineers operate must be understood, which represents the first
research objective.
Research Objective #1: Utilize the unique approach of System
Dynamics to build and validate a model of the Air Force Civil
Engineer officer career field and how it is used to complete
current mission objectives.
System Dynamics is a tool used to model the behavioral trends within a complex
system over time. In this research, it will be used to understand how garrison and
expeditionary mission requirements change over time and the career field's reaction to
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fulfilling them. As previously mentioned, Air Force Civil Engineers fill both regular and
additional operational requirements, relying on contractors to manage the excess.
Therefore special emphasis will be placed on the points within the model which decide
how resources are divided and training is aligned, such as policy, structure, and training.
The second research objective relates these key points transforming knowledge base.
Research Objective #2: Through system analysis, determine the
factors giving rise to the transformation of knowledge and the
endogenous leverage points to minimize it.
There are two approaches to the knowledge transformation; it’s either acceptable
or unacceptable to some degree. While such a decision is reserved for Air Force Civil
Engineer career field leadership, this research assumes the transformation is not
completely acceptable and explores the system’s endogenous leverage points that, when
exploited, can alter the transformative behavior. Additionally, because expeditionary
contractors can be costly, tedious, and often reduce the inherent flexibility and reliability
required (Singer, 2003; Palmby, 2006; Verkuil, 2007), the model will also address the
expeditionary contractor reliance. Utilizing the leverage points of Research Objective #2
to explore alternative changes (such as organizational structure, force balance, or policy)
and then make career field recommendations is the intent of the third research objective.
Research Objective #3: Develop a framework to compare the
affects of these leverage points and explore alternative policies
(career field structure, new training policy, etc.) and their associated
trade-offs to meet current and future mission requirements.
The Cold War era career field structure and training regime utilized today is long
overdue for revision (Barnett, 2005). The current structure is optimal for short duration,
high intensity, state versus state conflict; conversely, the United States is currently
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involved in long duration, low intensity, state versus non-state combat operations
(Addison, 2008). To say that the current structure and training is not optimal is
presumptive, as many aspects coincide very well with current mission requirements.
However, because of the immense transformations to modern warfare over the past four
decades there is a significant possibility of an alternative structure emerging that is more
suitable. Therefore, career field structure and training will be particularly reviewed in
conjunction with expeditionary contractors.

Scope
The scope of the research and subsequent recommendations is limited to the Air
Force Civil Engineer officer career field at the functional level. It does not address staff
level operations as those are considered administrative functions whose primary purpose
is to support functional level activities. Similarly, a model is a simplification of a real
world system and as such it is impossible to account for every subtle nuance. Therefore,
this research was aggregated to a macroscopic level concerning how garrison and
expeditionary mission requirements are accomplished. As such, recent Civil Engineer
squadron reorganization efforts (Eulberg, 2008b) and other details within the unit level
organization have no impact on the model. The model does, however, address the
macroscopic factors affecting those individual organizations.
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II. Literature Review

A Brief History of Air Force Civil Engineers
Air Force Civil Engineers have a long history originating back to World War I as
a small unit of the Army Signal Corps, later transferring into the Army Air Corps. The
Air Corps recognized the necessity of specialized engineers before World War II and in
1940 began training a small handful of men to form the 21st Engineer (Aviation)
Regiment. These engineers were to be instructed on how to construct, conceal, maintain,
and defend airfields. The success of the unit and commencement of the war landed the
21st as a parent unit to over 100,000 engineers serving in every theater. Their excellence
was evident as the first airstrip was completed in Normandy within 15 hours of forces
landing during the D-Day operation (Hartzer, 2008).
As the Air Force became its own service, construction services were eventually
handed from the Army Corps of Engineers to the AF Director of Civil Engineering (now
known as the Air Force Civil Engineer) and engineer services at air installations came
under the responsibility of the Base Civil Engineer. However, following a series of minicrises in the 1960’s (Lebanon, Berlin, Cuba), it became apparent the Air Force needed to
develop a deployment platform for engineers responding to wartime emergencies. This
led to the formation of Prime BEEF (Base Engineer Emergency Force) and RED HORSE
(Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer) squadrons,
first employed in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict. The Prime BEEF units
were organized out of existing Base Civil Engineer units to build, operate, and maintain
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forward air bases while RED HORSE was created for the sole purpose of large-scale
contingency construction (Hartzer, 2008).
This organizational structure proved extremely successful not only in Southeast
Asia, but also in subsequent robust Cold War training programs and the first Gulf War.
Because of this early success, it has remained as the organizational structure employed
today despite the change to modern, irregular warfare. To later understand these changes,
it is first necessary to gain an appreciation of these two units, their similarities and
differences, and the original intent of each.
Prime BEEF
Prime BEEF units were created as a way to organize Base Civil Engineer
squadrons to provide the capability to quickly respond to worldwide emergencies. This
ability to go anywhere anytime is essential in today’s era of globalization where the
enemy does not exist as a set entity in a specific location. Prime BEEF’s mission varies
between its two major work environments: in-garrison and expeditionary. In-garrison,
Prime BEEF units operate within the Base Civil Engineer squadron tasked with
performing SRM (sustainment, restoration, and modernization), O&M, (operation and
maintenance), planning and development, and minor construction; hence Prime BEEF
units are located at nearly every active Air Force installation worldwide, providing
valuable garrison training opportunities. In the expeditionary environment, Prime BEEF
units are organized around small-scale contingency construction and installation
operation and maintenance; the difference being a short-term contingency focus rather
than long-term sustainment operations now going on twenty years in Iraq. However, as
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan protract into what some have dubbed the “Long War”,
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Prime BEEF engineers are found performing expeditionary work that was traditionally
reserved for permanent, garrison locations (National Museum of the USAF, 2008a).
Because Prime BEEF units do not include the personnel or equipment for heavy
construction, major construction in-garrison is provided by contractors. This
immediately creates a garrison dependency on contractors while providing Prime BEEF
engineers with the opportunity to develop construction management skills. In the
expeditionary environment, heavy construction is generally handled by RED HORSE;
though in recent years civilian contractors have been increasingly utilized because of the
increased requirements for more permanent construction and nation building efforts.
RED HORSE
RED HORSE units differ from Prime BEEF units in that they are self-sustaining
and accountable to no specific operating location. These units are comprised of a much
wider span of personnel and capabilities; heavy equipment and maintenance, food
service, contracting and medical to name a few. This breadth of capability allows greater
flexibility in completing a much larger scope of work, such as large scale construction,
runway repair, and concrete batch or asphalt plants. Unlike Prime BEEF units, RED
HORSE units are considered an expeditionary theater asset and therefore play no part in
regular installation sustainment; they are only located at four active Air Force
installations but report directly to higher headquarters rather than these installations’
leadership.
Recent demand for RED HORSE engineers in support of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan has created an extremely high deployment tempo, even requiring Prime
BEEF personnel to augment RED HORSE teams. Additionally, due to a limited engineer

8

capability in sister-services these Air Force engineers are consistently deploying to do
everything from Army motor pool construction to Marine beddown. However, RED
HORSE operations are not limited to the contingency setting. Because of their
capability, RED HORSE aides in humanitarian projects in areas throughout the United
States and abroad and conducts in-garrison training projects to hone their wartime skills
at AF installations worldwide (National Museum of the USAF, 2008b).
RED HORSE and Prime BEEF engineers underwent one final transformation in
the 1990s. Despite multiple involvements around the world in areas such as Somalia,
Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bosnia, and Turkey, the career field saw a 42 percent
reduction in total force (47% for military) and a consolidation of the 26 specialty codes to
just 13 (Hartzer, 2008). As the soviet threat disappeared, there came a push to downsize
the force with the simultaneous goal of maintaining current readiness levels. Thus, a
“reengineering” or “lean” revolution spilled over from the private sector into the
government and forced engineers to “do more with less" - the accepted battle cry of Civil
Engineers in the 21st century.

Current Situation
Immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, Air Force
civil engineers responded by deploying more than 2,000 personnel to 13 bases in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on top of the hundreds of military personnel
already supporting Operations Northern and Southern Watch. Two years later, with the
beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), engineers deployed over 4,500 additional
personnel to establish 12 new bases and expand all 10 existing bases in the region.
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Combined with maintaining the home station mission, OEF and OIF have set a high
standard for the 15,000 Air Force Civil Engineers to maintain.
The AEF (Air Expeditionary Force) Cycle, originally designed as a structured
deployment process to give airmen a sense of predictability, has since become inadequate
for engineers. Instead of the intended 120 day, four-to-one dwell deployment cycle (four
120 day cycles at home to one cycle deployed), engineers became formally classified as
an “enabler” in January 2007 with deployment cycles shifting to 180 day, two-to-one
dwells. Then, in 2009 Civil Engineer officers moved into the highest classification –
one-to-one dwells. According to the Air Force Civil Engineer, of the 15,000 active duty
personnel more than 3,900 are deployed at any one time with 62% percent of those
serving in roles that are traditionally filled by members of other services (Beyers, 2010).
This has helped place nine of the thirteen Civil Engineer specialties, including officers, in
the “stressed” category - meaning there are insufficient trained personnel to fill critical
positions supporting the expeditionary (deployed) and garrison (home station) missions.

Doctrine and the New Mission
During the Vietnam and subsequent Cold War years the strategic military focus
was on containment operations defined by high-intensity, short-duration state-on-state
armed conflict against an enemy with rational, political or ideological motives.
Conversely, today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are low-intensity, long duration state
versus non-state combat operations against an enemy with irrational, religious motives
(Addison, 2008); or, Irregular Warfare. In the words of former President John F.
Kennedy (1962), “This is another type of war…it requires…a whole new kind of
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strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind
of military training."
The U.S. Air Force defines Irregular Warfare as “a violent struggle among state
and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations” (AFDD
2-3, 2007). By definition, legitimacy and influence are the main objectives that must be
achieved and Nagl (2002) identified two archetypes to accomplish this: the Hearts and
Minds and the Cost Benefit Theories. While the latter focuses on raising the insurgents’
costs associated with waging the rebellion (and thus outweighing the benefit), the Hearts
and Minds theory attempts to win the popular support of the nation through security,
reconstruction, economic development, and governance. The Hearts and Minds strategy,
in parallel with AFDD 2-3, requires counterinsurgency forces to be involved with the
local population to erode insurgency support and thus render irrelevant the opposing
military forces. A key component to this, then, is accomplished through rebuilding the
nation's government and infrastructure; or, Nation Building.
The concept of Nation Building is not new, with roots dating back to the Marshall
Plan in post-World War II Europe. Similarly, the U.S. is currently spending millions of
dollars on rebuilding schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and security in the impoverished
nations of Iraq and Afghanistan through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The
stated mission of the PRTs are to "help provincial governments with: developing a
transparent and sustained capability to govern, promoting increased security and rule of
law, promoting political and economic development and providing provincial
administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population" (Department of State,
2008).
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Not only do Air Force engineers fulfill these reconstruction positions to rebuild
the country, but traditional contingency construction roles must be fulfilled as well. The
protracted approach that is indicative of IW requires a long-term strategy for victory and
extended forward basing of troops. Thus, combatant commander demand for Prime
BEEF and RED HORSE engineers has increased considerably as operations on two
fronts (OEF and OIF), doubled mission requirements, and prolonged operational
requirements of what some call the “Long War” (Addison, 2007) challenge the Civil
Engineer career field.
It is apparent the Civil Engineer career field cannot carry on with these
requirements without significant stress to the career field and assistance from civilian
contractors. The ad hoc solution being currently employed hinges on the heavy reliance
on contractors to handle work military personnel are under-resourced to accomplish.
This dependency carries with it myriad of potential problems.

Contractor Reliance
Defense contracting in recent years appears to parallel the changes other
industries are experiencing in the era of globalization: a shift from manufacturer to
service provider (Palmby, 2006). The key component empowering this transformation is
the use of outsourcing. In general, outsourcing is aimed at increasing the flexibility,
effectiveness, and efficiency of an organization by streamlining operations toward the
core mission or specialty of the organization (Kelty, 2005). According to the A-76
Circular (2003) which lays the foundation for proper government outsourcing procedures,
"The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the private sector
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for needed commercial services. To ensure that the American people receive maximum
value for their tax dollars, commercial activities should be subject to the forces of
competition." While this seems rational and advantageous in the garrison environment,
the initiative can act very differently in the contingency setting.
Despite the intentions of outsourcing, objective and subjective assessments of
contractor performance in Iraq reveal the intended goals of the initiative are not
necessarily being met (CBO, 2008 & Singer, 2003). While the use of civilians by the
U.S. military dates back to Revolutionary War, the current conflicts mark an increasing
trend in their employment; as of 2008 U.S. Central Command reported the number of
contractors had surpassed military personnel in the Iraqi theater (CBO, 2008). The
following year, the same milestone was met in Afghanistan. This quantitative increase in
reliance raises concerns over qualitative issues.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in a December 5, 2005
speech that “I personally am of the view that there are a lot of things that can be done for
a short time basis by contractors…any idea that we shouldn't have them I think would be
unwise." However, David Graff, commander of the Defense Contract Management
Agency, in a September 30, 2008 letter about KBR (one of the largest construction
contractors in Iraq/Afghanistan) rebuffed that contractors were "not sufficiently in touch
with the urgency or realities of what was actually occurring on the ground. Many within
the Department of Defense have lost or are losing all remaining confidence in KBR's
ability to successfully and repeatedly perform." And according to the Government
Accountability Office (1995), “We cannot convincingly prove nor disprove that the
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results of federal agencies’ contracting out decisions have been beneficial and costeffective.” So what do these contradictions mean?
The problem existing today is the lack of empirical research detailing
performance of civilian contractors in wartime scenarios; the Department of Defense
states they are necessary yet simultaneously criticizes their performance. Nearly all
information currently held on expeditionary civilian contractors consists of anecdotal
criticism on cost and quality. The lone standing comprehensive report was issued by the
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in 2008, which listed numerous quality
violations by contractors; however, their success and mission enhancement were not
included. Additionally, government agencies have failed to look at the impact of
expeditionary contractors on mission reliability and long-term organizational goals
(McPeak & Ellis, 2004). These are questions currently without answers and because the
military, and civil engineers in particular, rely on contractors to accomplish the
expeditionary mission (Singer, 2004; Congressional Budgeting Office, 2008; &
Government Accountability Office, 2008), finding those answers are critical to
identifying if contractors are truly worthwhile.

Total Force Application
The National Military Strategy directs the nation’s military to be capable of
sustaining operations for two major theaters of war simultaneously; a feat that would
prove extremely costly if exclusively met with active duty forces (Department of
Defense, 2008). Instead, the military operates in a Total Force concept, integrating active
duty, reserve, National Guard, civilians, and even contractors from all branches into an
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interdependent force, available when needed and stood down when not. This
organization is "consistent with the pre-Cold War model of force structure and is
expressly designed with flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in mind"
(Palmby, 2006).
Outsourcing is intended to allow the military to "fulfill home-base requirements
with civil-service or private-industry personnel, thus freeing military troops for deployed
operations" (Palmby, 2006). However, the Congressional Budget Office (2008) reported
80,000 base support and 30,000 construction personnel working on contracts in Iraq for
the Department of Defense (out of a total of 190,000 contractors). Questions as to
whether these contractors are also part of the Total Force are important issues to consider.
For example, when an airman separates to join a private firm contracted by the
government is it a matter of retention or a lateral move within the same organization
(Kelty, 2005)? For the purposes of this research contractors who are integrated into the
military to provide a specific technical capability or service are a part of the Total Force,
while those hired on a contract to provide a product are not. Under this definition, many
expeditionary contractors such as those providing infrastructure maintenance would be
considered part of the Total Force.
Using this definition of a Total Force civilian contractor, Table 1 below describes
specifically the current disbursement of the Total Force in the Air Force Civil Engineer
career field broken down by major command. It is interesting to note the overall total
shows the career field is only 35% military, down from 41% in 2007 (Eulberg, 2007).
Part of this can be attributed to A-76 actions in Air Education and Training Command,
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but the overall effect is part of a much larger push to civilianize and contract out
traditional garrison engineering roles that are not military essential.
Table 1: Civil Engineer career field Total Force manning by command (Eulberg, 2008a).
Command Military Civilian Contractor % Military % Civilian % Contractor
ACC
3,802
2,279
2,003
47.0%
28.0%
25.0%
AETC
1,776
2,627
2,040
27.0%
41.0%
32.0%
AFMC
218
1,564
2,183
6.0%
39.0%
55.0%
AFSOC
482
208
158
57.0%
24.0%
19.0%
AFSPC
1,105
1,350
800
33.0%
42.0%
25.0%
AMC
2,197
1,231
1,100
49.0%
27.0%
24.0%
PACAF
2,829
3,378
2,290
33.0%
40.0%
27.0%
USAFE
2,164
2,318
2,115
33.0%
35.0%
32.0%
DRUs
555
950
2,055
15.0%
27.0%
58.0%
AD Totals 15,128 15,905
14,744
33.0%
35.0%
32.0%
ANG/AFR
14,146
1,007
301
91.0%
7.0%
2.0%

Army Case Study
The perfect example of reliance on expeditionary contractors can be found in the
U. S. Army. The Army, slightly different than Air Force Civil Engineering, is split into a
public works section (the U.S Army Corps of Engineers) and combat engineer brigades.
At the end of the Cold War, massive troop reductions swept through the Department of
Defense and in an attempt to maintain a sufficient level of front-line infantry personnel
vast numbers of Army military engineers were moved to the reserve component. The
Corps of Engineers now currently operates with 34,000 civilians and only 650 military
personnel (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2009). Combat engineers similarly took
drastic cuts and while "the Army is attempting to reduce our deployed footprint by
maximizing use of host-nation and contract engineers, this plan directly threatens the
need for our current number of combat-heavy battalions" (Lindsay, 2000).
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As these changes in the Army took effect, requirements continued in areas such as
the Balkans. To meet these demands, the Army supplemented military with contractors
and in 1992 fully initiated the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) to
create a standing contract source to meet mission requirements as they arose (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 2009). LOGCAP has now awarded over $25 billion to KBR alone
for their work supporting Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. Additionally, LOGCAP just
started a new 10 year, $150 billion dollar contract in September 2008. To bring this
spending into comparison, the Army pays $500,000 per day for approximately 1200
contractors to operate Bagram Air Base (West, 2009); a job that could be done by
military personnel for almost half the price according to the Congressional Budget Office
(2008).
In addition to complaints about contractor costs is the issue of reliability and
flexibility. A squadron of military personnel is highly reliable: committed to the
organization, flexible to changing military needs without requiring extensive
documentation or added costs, can generally perform quality control on themselves, and
can construct today and defend tomorrow if needed. How reliable is an engineer team as
a whole when the entire contract force at an operating base could decide the situation is
too dangerous for them, such as the 2004 banning of Philippine citizens from Iraq by the
Philippine government? While there is no specific measure to gauge civilian reliability,
the risks must nevertheless be weighed by military leaders.
As the reliance on expeditionary contractors continues, organizations (such as the
Corps of Engineers) enter a reinforcing cycle that forces further and further reliance on
others as their technical knowledge base erodes away. As mentioned previously, 62% of
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current Air Force Civil Engineer deployments are to sister services; almost all of which
are in capacities that would normally be filled by Army engineers. Air Force Civil
Engineers are very good at conducting installation sustainment operations (a task that has
risen in importance as counterinsurgency strategies utilize a Forward Operating Base
construct to project personnel into local communities), making their services invaluable
in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Beyers, 2010). While Air Force Civil Engineers may be a
long road away from reaching a similar situation as the Army, it serves as a reminder and
lesson for what can happen from one small change in organizational structure. It is
because of this the Air Force Civil Engineer career field will be modeled to analyze
potential alternative solutions.

Knowledge Delineation
Knowledge is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as (i) expertise and skills
acquired by a person through experience or education; the theoretical or practical
understanding of a subject; (ii) what is known in a particular field or in total; facts and
information; or (iii) awareness or familiarity gained by experience of a fact or situation.
For the research presented herein, knowledge represents the collective body of
information related to a specific field that can be acquired through experience or
education. The specific fields of concern are technical and managerial knowledge in the
Air Force Civil Engineer officer career field. To define the specific knowledge of these
fields, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) was used.
The O*NET is a comprehensive system sponsored by the US Department of
Labor and is designed to describe occupations based on data gathered over six decades,
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including more than 1,100 specific descriptions of different occupational titles.
Specifically, it includes data on the mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are needed
to perform the variety of activities and tasks associated with each occupation.
Researchers use it as a guide for defining specific occupational information and have
validated it as a sound research tool (Liu, Spector, & Jex, 2005 and Jeanneret & Strong,
2003).
Accordingly, O*NET was used to compare the knowledge of the technical and
managerial work areas in the Air Force Civil Engineer career field. The technical side is
represented by the occupation of Civil Engineers whereas Engineering Managers
represent the managerial side. While many of the technical specialties among Air Force
Civil Engineers include more engineering disciplines such as electrical and mechanical
engineers, those technical specialties of the civil engineer are closely related and provide
a baseline for comparison. A description of the tasks associated with each occupation is
shown in Table 2. Additionally, Table 3 highlights the two occupations’ knowledge
components with disparities highlighted in red.
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Table 2: Tasks for Civil Engineers and Engineering Managers (O*NET, 2010).
Civil Engineer
Manage and direct staff members and the
construction, operations, or maintenance
activities at project site.
Provide technical advice regarding design,
construction, or program modifications and
structural repairs to industrial and managerial
personnel.
Inspect project sites to monitor progress and
ensure conformance to design specifications
and safety or sanitation standards.

Engineering Manager
Coordinate and direct projects, making
detailed plans to accomplish goals and
directing the integration of technical activities.
Consult or negotiate with clients to prepare
project specifications.

Estimate quantities and cost of materials,
equipment, or labor to determine project
feasibility.
Test soils and materials to determine the
adequacy and strength of foundations,
concrete, asphalt, or steel.
Compute load and grade requirements, water
flow rates, and material stress factors to
determine design specifications.
Plan and design transportation or hydraulic
systems and structures, following construction
and government standards, using design
software and drawing tools.

Direct, review, and approve product design
and changes.

Present and explain proposals, reports, and
findings to clients.

Review and recommend or approve contracts
and cost estimates.
Prepare budgets, bids, and contracts, and
direct the negotiation of research contracts.

Perform administrative functions such as
reviewing and writing reports, approving
expenditures, enforcing rules, and making
decisions about the purchase of materials or
services.
Analyze survey reports, maps, drawings,
Analyze technology, resource needs, and
blueprints, aerial photography, and other
market demand, to plan and assess the
topographical or geologic data to plan projects. feasibility of projects.
Prepare or present public reports on topics such Confer with management, production, and
as bid proposals, deeds, environmental impact marketing staff to discuss project
statements, or property and right-of-way
specifications and procedures.
descriptions.
Direct or participate in surveying to lay out
Recruit employees, assign, direct, and
installations and establish reference points,
evaluate their work, and oversee the
grades, and elevations to guide construction.
development and maintenance of staff
competence.
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Table 3: Knowledge components for Civil Engineers and Engineering Managers
(O*NET, 2010).
Civil Engineers
Engineering Managers
Engineering and Technology — Knowledge of the
practical application of engineering science and
technology. This includes applying principles,
techniques, procedures, and equipment to the design
and production of various goods and services.
Design — Knowledge of design techniques, tools, and
principles involved in production of precision technical
plans, blueprints, drawings, and models.
Building and Construction — Knowledge of
materials, methods, and the tools involved in the
construction or repair of houses, buildings, or other
structures such as highways and roads.
Mathematics — Knowledge of arithmetic, algebra,
geometry, calculus, statistics, and their applications.
Physics — Knowledge of prediction of physical
principles, laws, their interrelationships, and
applications to understanding fluid, material, and
atmospheric dynamics, and mechanical, electrical,
atomic, and sub- atomic structures and processes.
Transportation — Knowledge of principles and
methods for moving people or goods by air, rail, sea or
road, including the relative costs and benefits.

Administration and Management — Knowledge of
business and management principles involved in
strategic planning, resource allocation, human
resources modeling, leadership technique, production
methods, and coordination of people and resources.
Customer and Personal Service — Knowledge of
principles and processes for providing customer and
personal services. This includes customer needs
assessment, meeting quality standards for services, and
evaluation of customer satisfaction.
Public Safety and Security — Knowledge of relevant
equipment, policies, procedures, and strategies to
promote effective local, state, or national security
operations for the protection of people, data, property,
and institutions.

Engineering and Technology — Knowledge of
the practical application of engineering science and
technology. This includes applying principles,
techniques, procedures, and equipment to the
design and production of various goods and
services.
Design — Knowledge of design techniques, tools,
and principles involved in production of precision
technical plans, blueprints, drawings, and models.
Computers and Electronics — Knowledge of
circuit boards, processors, chips, electronic
equipment, and computer hardware and software,
including applications and programming.
Mathematics — Knowledge of arithmetic,
algebra, geometry, calculus, statistics, and their
applications.
Administration and Management — Knowledge
of business and management principles involved in
strategic planning, resource allocation, human
resources modeling, leadership technique,
production methods, and coordination of people
and resources.
Physics — Knowledge of prediction of physical
principles, laws, their interrelationships, and
applications to understanding fluid, material, and
atmospheric dynamics, and mechanical, electrical,
atomic, and sub- atomic structures and processes.
Customer and Personal Service — Knowledge
of principles and processes for providing customer
and personal services. This includes customer
needs assessment, meeting quality standards for
services, and evaluation of customer satisfaction.
Production and Processing — Knowledge of raw
materials, production processes, quality control,
costs, and other techniques for maximizing the
effective manufacture and distribution of goods.
Personnel and Human Resources — Knowledge
of principles and procedures for personnel
recruitment, selection, training, compensation and
benefits, labor relations and negotiation, and
personnel information systems.

As illustrated, Civil Engineers and Engineering Managers have many overlapping
knowledge components. Of the three disparities for Engineering Managers, only
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‘Personnel and Human Resources’ is unique to the Engineering Management occupation;
‘Production and Processing’ and ‘Computers and Electronics’ are common knowledge
components to other engineering disciplines such as mechanical and electrical
engineering, which is logical considering engineering management roles may encompass
elements of all disciplines of engineering. However, the seven common knowledge
components do suggest that technical knowledge and management knowledge contain a
common core knowledge set.
Perhaps more importantly, given the overlap, the technical knowledge may serve
as a necessary prerequisite for the successful performance of engineering management
roles. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook (2010a)
suggests, “strong technical knowledge is essential for engineering managers who must
understand and guide the work of their subordinates and explain the work in nontechnical terms to senior management and potential customers. Therefore, most
managers have formal education and work experience as an engineer, scientist, or
mathematician.” The handbook goes on to emphasize the importance of technical
experience as the stepping-stone to managerial roles. This creates an interesting dynamic
in relation to the knowledge transformation of the Air Force Civil Engineer career field.
If knowledge and experience in a technically oriented occupation is a precursor to
success in a managerially oriented occupation, then what happens if that experience is
reduced due to shifting mission requirements (i.e. increased contractors requiring more
oversight)? That is a question perfectly suited for a System Dynamics methodology.
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The System Dynamics Approach
Most engineered systems are designed with the implicit goal of achieving
predictable effects and to do it efficiently (Shelley, 2009). However, we are often not
afforded the luxury of designing a system but instead must create an understanding of the
systems already in operation in the world around us. So in order to analyze the Total
Force system at work in the Air Force Civil Engineer career field, the System Dynamics
paradigm offers the opportunity to create this understanding. In System Dynamics, a
given behavior is used to generate the system's underlying framework. Within this realworld representative framework, endogenous system structures of relationships and
closed loop feedbacks generate a dynamic perspective which can be understood
mechanistically.
Using the System Dynamics paradigm is beneficial for a number of reasons.
Modeling makes it possible to replicate the Civil Engineer officer career field and "test"
various Total Force structures and their resultant performance without affecting current
operations. It can be used as an on-going tool to explore system behavior in new and
uncertain situations, planning for future contingencies and gaining an understanding of
expected reactions.
System Dynamics is a simple, five step process consisting of conceptualizing,
building, formulating, testing, and implementing the model. First, the modeler must
conceptualize the unstructured and complex to create a mental model of the system. This
mental model includes displaying a reference mode, which is generally an observed,
unwanted behavior that intrigues the initiation of the modeling process. It is this
reference mode that is dynamic (not system state), affected by and effecting other
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components of the model; the system components are what cause the reference mode
behavior. Utilizing the reference mode and basic system definitions from
conceptualization, the second step begins iteratively building endogenous cause-effect
interactions to create a system of causal, closed feedback loops, either compensating or
reinforcing.
Once this causal-loop diagram is conceptualized, the third step of formulation
can begin. Here, the cause-effect relationships represent a system of flows that change
component values over time (hence the dynamic perspective). These relationships are
then represented as written mathematical equations which can be simulated using
software. The simulations are part of the fourth step, which is testing of the model.
Multiple simulations, tests, and validations allow an iterative process from steps one and
two to help refine the model into an accurate representation of the real world. The fifth
and final step is then only to implement the model, using it to enact policy variations and
test hypotheses about the system.
Here lies the inherent value of System Dynamics; a well understood and
validated real-world representative system that provides insight into the system’s
behavior, not possible otherwise. By identifying the behaviors of the Air Force Civil
Engineer Total Force system, representing them through cause-effect relationships and
gaining intuition about the system’s behaviors, new force structures, balance, and policies
can be explored to make more efficient use of scarce resources to better meet operational
mission requirements.

24

III. Methods

The following chapter introduces the concept of System Dynamics and how it uniquely
provides an appropriate methodology for analyzing the Air Force Civil Engineer career
field’s knowledge base erosion. System Dynamics, first developed by Jay W. Forrester
in the 1960’s, is “a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback systems”
(System Dynamics Society, 2010). The methodology consists of five steps which will be
covered shortly, but first it is important to understand what makes System Dynamics
unique.
System Dynamics is set apart from other methodologies by the “System
Dynamics Paradigm,” which consists of four characteristics (Shelley, 2009). The first
characteristic is a dynamic perspective, meaning rather than focusing on a specific system
state, System Dynamics is committed to analyzing the system’s behavior over time.
Because of this focus on behavior, traditional statistical analysis of model outputs against
real-world data is inappropriate; instead, a qualitative analysis relating behavior is used.
The second characteristic is the system as cause, meaning the behavior creating the
dynamic perspective arises from the causal structure within the system rather than
external to the system. While often systems fail given a specific external input, System
Dynamics is not concerned with changing that input but instead strengthening the system
by looking internally at an endogenous viewpoint to correct problematic behavior. The
third characteristic is a closed loop perspective, meaning the system is represented by a
set of closed, causal feedback loops where most variables are endogenous to the system.
Feedback refers to the relationship between X and Y where not only does X affect Y but
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Y also affects X, though perhaps indirectly. It is impossible to study the relationship of X
to Y and Y to X independently and make accurate predictions of system behavior, only
when the system as a whole is accounted for (including feedback) can appropriate
conclusions be reached. This concept compliments the second characteristic (system as
cause) as problematic behavior is traced to specific feedback loops endogenous to the
system. The final characteristic of System Dynamics is operational thinking. As will be
explained further shortly, System Dynamics begins as a “mental model” which is
observable, real-world behavior. This behavior is then reconstructed in the model to
create cause-and-effect relationships where all variables also represent real-world
counterparts. This mechanistic view enables the comparison of system behavior to realworld behavior and the exploration of “what-if” scenarios.
Built on these foundational characteristics, the System Dynamics methodology
consists of five steps: Problem Identification, Development of Causal Logic, Model
Formulation, Model Simulation and Validation, and Policy Generation and
Implementation (Shelley, 2009; with modifications). The following sections cover these
five steps, using Air Force Civil Engineer Technical Knowledge Base as a small
demonstration for the overall process.

Step 1: Problem Identification
Problem identification is the visual recognition of a real-world issue requiring
attention, investigation, and correction. This visualization comes in the form of a mental
model of an operational system and some problematic result occurring within it. The
problem is evidenced by a behavior called a Reference Mode, which is a notional
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representation of system behavioral patterns over time, either historical or hypothesized.
For example, in chapters one and two the problem of an eroding technical knowledge
base in the Air Force Civil Engineer career field was identified. This behavioral pattern
can be expressed graphically, as shown in Figure 1. The desired behavior is a steady
increase to some target level; however, the observed behavior is degradation and
subsequent steady state at a much lower level, hence the problem.
Technical Knowledge Base

Desired

Observed

Time

Figure 1: Reference Mode Diagram for Technical Knowledge Base.

It is important when graphing the reference mode or any other behavior using a
System Dynamics methodology is to express it in terms of a smooth behavior. A
common mistake is to include all aspects of real-world data (peaks, valleys, etc.) and
attempt to perfectly recreate that output in the system model. In System Dynamics,
extraneous noise should be eliminated to uncover the underlying behavioral response.
This allows analysis of long-term behavioral trends not as easily found or predicted using
statistical analysis of historical data.
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The second half of the problem identification step is the recognition of other
important variables whose values define the current state of the system. These variables,
called stocks (or state variables), are influenced directly by in-flows and out-flows,
meaning the stocks represent an accumulation of these flows, their history, and
combinations. A stock, combined with its flows, creates an infrastructure which
produces a dynamic behavior. This behavior is called a Virgin Behavior and provides the
basic building blocks for the model. Virgin Behaviors are different than Reference
Modes. As mentioned, a Reference Mode is a problematic behavior produced from the
system, whereas a Virgin Behavior is the individual stock’s behavior when isolated from
the system. For example, given Figure 1 the plot labeled “observed” is the Reference
Mode while “desired” represents the Virgin Behavior.
Virgin Behaviors are generally classified into one of ten standard behavioral
categories. While the exact rate and value of the behavior may vary, the underlying
infrastructure they generate is the same. Some common reference mode behaviors are
displayed in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Common Reference Mode Diagrams (Sterman, 2000).
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For example, the forthcoming model includes a stock named Expeditionary Nation
Building Mission representing a changing requirement for a technically centered Air
Force Civil Engineer workload. The Virgin Behavior of this stock is S-shaped;
requirements begin small as the conflict begins, then builds rapidly as a military strategy
converges on winning support of the local population, then levels off at some required
level (graphical representation shown in Figure 3). While this stock is not immediately
tied to the Technical Knowledge Base problem, its value defines the current state of the
system and its Virgin Behavior represents underlying cause and effect relationships.

Expeditionary Nation
Building Mission

Time

Figure 3: Virgin Behavior of Expeditionary Nation Building Mission.

Step 2: Development of Causal Logic
The second step in the System Dynamics methodology is to convert the Virgin
Behaviors into their appropriate cause and effect relationship structure, then connect the
system components together to create a Causal Diagram of feedback loops. Returning to
Figure 1 and the Virgin Behavior of Technical Knowledge Base in the Civil Engineer
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career field, Figure 4 illustrates the causal structure corresponding to the behavior. The
structure is called Approach to Steady State, as named for its illustrated behavior. The
flow titled Increasing Knowledge Base represents various internal system entities adding
to the Technical Knowledge Base stock. Conversely, the flow Decreasing Knowledge
Base takes away from the stock. However, Decreasing Knowledge Base is influenced by
the current level of Technical Knowledge Base. Think of it rationally, if an individual
has X amount of information retained, they will lose it at some rate Y. However, if the
same individual increases their knowledge to X*2, retaining that level of knowledge will
be more difficult causing the rate of decrease (Y) to happen more rapidly (not necessarily
Y*2, however). This is the premise behind the Approach to Steady State, where the
causal loop created by Decreasing Knowledge Base prevents Technical Knowledge Base
from spiraling out of control; it compensates.

Figure 4: Causal Diagram and Virgin Behavior for Technical Knowledge Base.

All causal loops work within a system work to either reinforce or compensate. A
Reinforcing Loop creates perpetual growth, often sending the system spiraling out of
control. Conversely, as shown in Figure 4, a Compensating Loop works to balance
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system behavior and inhibit intensification of actions. There are many examples of these
phenomena in the real world, including compounding interest (reinforcing) and a
thermostat (compensating). These loops often work in conjunction, for example while
population growth (births) is reinforcing, a second causal loop for population decline
(deaths) is simultaneously compensating to keep the system stable.
The procedure of converting the Virgin Behaviors into a causal structure
culminates with their interconnection to create multiple feedback loops, and ultimately
the system itself. This process follows an intuitive approach, matching causal and effect
relationships with known influence. As these connections are made, the system begins to
take shape as connections reveal reinforcing or compensating loops that have formed.
The actions of these loops, particularly the reinforcing loops, also provide insight to
potential areas of concern – instability – within the model.

Step 3: Model Formulation
Equipped with the Causal Diagram for the system, the next step of System
Dynamics modeling is formulating causal relationships into mathematical relationships
that extend and elaborate the initial model into a mechanistic format, called a Flow
Diagram. This process proceeds much like Step 2, first at the individual stock level and
gradually making intra-system connections. During this process the modeler
continuously checks model performance to ensure the operational behavior being built
matches the previously determined Virgin Behavior and makes intuitive sense
conceptually. Model validity, discussed further later, is built throughout this process as
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behavior is recognized and accepted as accurate and the completed model correctly
displays the original Reference Mode behavior.
However, when building the Flow Diagram (and the Causal Diagram) great care
must be taken to maintain the appropriate level of depth and breadth of detail included.
System Dynamics models must be aggregated to a level that appropriately provides a
level of detail unhampered by intricate details. At the same time, the model must be
broad enough to cover a suitable boundary for the system without stretching too far. As
previously mentioned, the modeling process begins with a mental model of the system;
this generally lies at point A of Figure 5. This mental model is commonly narrowly
focused and highly detailed. The challenge of System Dynamics then is to aggregate the
mental model as highly and simplistically as possible, then bring back the appropriate
level of detail and breadth that is appropriate (point B) while avoiding “the dangers.”

Figure 5: Model aggregation for System Dynamics modeling (IThink, 2001).

32

While formulating the Flow Diagram, there are some additional rules to follow.
All mathematical relationships must comply with the logic represented in the Causal
Diagram. However, iteration is a key component to the System Dynamics methodology;
as formulation uncovers further clarification, causal relationships can be revisited for
adjustment. These adjustments should not arise simply to “force” behavior to match
desired performance, but instead to improve the model and thus build confidence in its
accuracy. Additionally, the entire process with iterations should be continuously
communicated and confirmed with a client or expert to also gain confidence. Continuing
with the example, Figure 6 depicts the flow diagram for Technical Knowledge Base.

Figure 6: Flow Diagram and behavior of Technical Knowledge Base simulated in
STELLA 9.

Step 4: Model Simulation and Validation
With the model fully formulated mathematically into a Flow Diagram, it is now
ready for simulation and validation. However, simulation at this point has occurred
numerous times throughout the iterative modeling process to observe behavior and
validate the system structure. The simulation now should reflect hypothesized Reference
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Mode behavior. Unexpected behavior should be identified and checked for possible
flaws in the model or a realization of actual system behavior other than hypothesized that
provides better insight to the system’s behavior.
At this point, the validity of the model must be addressed. Validation of a System
Dynamics model “is the process of establishing confidence in the soundness and
usefulness of a model” (Shelley, 2009). Confidence is the appropriate criterion strictly
because there is no absolute proof of correctness in System Dynamics. The validity is
always in respect to a specific modeling purpose. The confidence is not gained through a
single test, but rather accumulated gradually throughout the iterative modeling process
and through passing multiple validation tests. The very nature of System Dynamics
warrants tests not generally acceptable to other modeling endeavors and likewise tests for
other models are inappropriate for System Dynamics. For example, a long-standing
conflict exists concerning the feasibility of statistical validation of model output against
real-world data. This is generally not possible because System Dynamics is concerned
with comparing model behavior patterns with real-world behavior patterns, not
prediction of specific data points at a specific time.
There are multiple formal tests used in System Dynamics to gain confidence (and
thus validity). These tests fall into two categories: test of model structure and tests of
model behavior. The following is a list of the tests and a brief explanation of each
(Forrester & Senge, 1980):
Tests of Model Structure:
- Structure Verification Test: a comparison of model structure directly with the
structure of the real system to verify a real-world representation.
- Parameter Verification Test: a test to ensure formulation parameters correspond
conceptually and numerically to real life.
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- Extreme Conditions Test: identification of stocks to which each rate equation
depends and manipulation to maximum and minimum plausible values to
demonstrate effect; this identifies structural flaws and enhances usefulness in
the normal operating range. This test is generally considered the most important.
- Boundary Adequacy Test: a test for appropriate aggregation and inclusion of all
relevant structure.
Tests of Model Behavior:
- Behavior Reproduction Tests: a test to ensure behavior is a consequence of
model structure.
- Behavior Anomaly Test: tracing anomalous behavior back to the structural
cause to reveal a flaw or identify unpredicted behavior in the real system, thus
building confidence.
- Boundary Adequacy Test: different from its structural counterpart, this test
conceptualizes additional structure which might influence behavior.
- Behavior Sensitivity Test: a test to seek plausible sets of parameter values that
cause behavior test to fail; confidence is built as these values cannot be found.

These tests build confidence in the model’s utility as a simulation tool of the real-world
system. Validation as a whole process works to gain insight into the model’s
infrastructure to gain an understanding that builds confidence in the methodology.

Step 5: Policy Generation and Implementation
The final step of the System Dynamics modeling process is to generate feasible
solutions in the form of policies that address the Reference Mode behavior. To generate
these policies, it is important to identify the reinforcing loops and key components
causing the unwanted behavior. These areas can then be used as leverage points, the
point of intervention by an artificial policy. The policies generated should be simple in
design, feasible in nature, measureable in qualitative impact on system behavior, and
effective. However, often a single solution will not completely rectify the Reference
Mode, requiring further search into the trade-offs of each potential policy solution.
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Armed with a thorough understanding of the system, a full confidence in the
model’s utility as a simulation tool, and a detailed inventory of potential policy solutions
and corresponding implications, a solution can be chosen and implemented in the realworld. The research presented here presents recommended solutions to provide guidance
for implementation by senior career field leadership and sheds light into further studies
for more other specific policy generation. The next chapter walks through these five
steps of model development, searching for that library of potential policy solutions.
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IV. Analysis and Results

The previous chapters of this research have established a theoretical framework of the
situation faced by the Air Force Civil Engineer officer career field and demonstrated the
practical application of a System Dynamics methodology to gain insight into the system
in operation. This chapter will now integrate that foundation into the implementation of a
working model to not only demonstrate the issues seen currently but also create a
platform for exploring various alternatives to alter Civil Engineer knowledge
transformation. As discussed in Chapter 2, technical knowledge serves as a prerequisite
to managerial knowledge, making it the focus point of the research. Therefore, the initial
modeling will focus solely on the technical knowledge side of the Civil Engineer officer
career field. The five step modeling process of the System Dynamics methodology
outlined in Chapter 3 provides the outline for this chapter.

Step 1: Problem Identification
As discussed in Chapter 3, the general modeling process starts by examining the
Reference Mode behavior and determining what model elements are necessary to
describe the system at any given time; or, what are the stocks. Identifying these stocks
and determining their Virgin Behavior provides the baseline for assembling the model.
The stocks identified as necessary to this model and their Virgin Behaviors are
summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4: Model stocks and Virgin Behaviors.
Model Element
Expeditionary Nation Building Mission
Expeditionary Base Operations Mission
Garrison Civilians & Contractors
Expeditionary Military Technical
Expeditionary Military Management
Expeditionary Contractors
Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency
Training Policy
Technical Knowledge Base
Garrison Military
Garrison Mission Requirement

Virgin Behavior
S-Shaped
S-Shaped
Goal Seeking
Goal Seeking
Goal Seeking
Goal Seeking
Goal Seeking with First-Order Drain
Goal Seeking
Approach to Steady State
No Natural Behavior
No Natural Behavior

The first elements identified are the Expeditionary Nation Building Mission and
Expeditionary Base Operations Mission (also known as Forward Operating Base, or FOB
operations). These two entities represent the two distinct missions faced by civil
engineers in the expeditionary environment, both of which require significant personnel,
resources, and time. However, the stocks represent only the technical aspect of the
mission to be accomplished; for the purposes of this model management functions are not
included here. The S-Shaped behavior of these stocks represent the initial gradual
mobilization of forces in response to conflict initiation, which then leads to a rapid
increase until leveling off at some steady state commensurate with conflict requirement.
As an example, at the start of the Iraq invasion of Spring 2003 it took six months for the
full American military force to occupy Iraq, which was done slowly initially as planning
and mobilization occurred, followed by a rapid flood of forces into the country. This
Virgin Behavior is represented in the causal diagram shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Causal Diagram and graph of Virgin Behavior of S-Shaped Structure.

The next Virgin Behavior to introduce is Goal Seeking, used by six of the eleven
stocks in this model (Garrison Civilians & Contractors, Expeditionary Military
Technical, Expeditionary Military Management, Expeditionary Contractors,
Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency, and Training Policy). A Goal Seeking structure is
characterized by a given goal for a specific stock which is compared to the current stock
level, producing a gap. This gap is then closed by an increased flow into the stock at a
given time constant. As the gap decreases the stock inflow too decreases, leveling the
stock at a steady state equal to the goal. For example, given a time constant of ½, for
each time unit the stock inflow would equal one half of the current gap; thus a goal of ten
and current stock level of zero would close the gap by five the first time unit, 2.5 the
second time unit, 1.25 the next, and so on until the stock level reaches the goal of ten.
This behavior is seen every day in investing, manufacturing, and retail. The Virgin
Behavior is shown in the causal diagram in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Causal Diagram and graph of Virgin Behavior of Goal Seeking Structure.

The stocks with Goal Seeking structures are listed and defined as follows:
-

-

Expeditionary Contractors: the number of contractors needed in addition to
Expeditionary Military Technical to meet the Total Expeditionary Mission
Requirement; these contractors’ focus is on technical work, not management.
Expeditionary Military Technical: the number of military personnel operating
in the expeditionary environment on the technical mission.
Expeditionary Military Management: the number of military personnel
operating in the expeditionary environment on the management mission.
Garrison Civilians & Contractors: the number of civilian and contractor
personnel working to meet Garrison Mission Requirements.
Training Policy: the percent of garrison time each Garrison Military
individual devotes to the Expeditionary Training Program.
Contractor Efficiency: the level of effectiveness maintained by Expeditionary
Contractors in performing technical tasks. (Units are work/person/time.)

The last of the six stocks represented by a Goal Seeking structure (contractor
efficiency) exhibits dual characteristics. Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency reacts to an
efficiency goal, but also exhibits a natural First Order Drain. This characteristic is not
hard to imagine when put into context of traditional human behavior. When an
individual learns something (or in this case becomes efficient at it), there will be a natural
atrophy of that knowledge over time unless some action is taken to prevent it. This is the
premise behind the hit television show “Are You Smarter Than A Fifth Grader,” a show
which faces adults against fifth graders answering elementary school level questions.
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The children almost inevitably win because they have been practicing the knowledge
while the adults have let it erode over time. A causal diagram of the Virgin Behavior for
a First Order Drain is shown in the causal diagram in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Causal Diagram and graph of Virgin Behavior of Draining Structure.

Similar to a first order drain is the last Virgin Behavior structure, the Approach to
Steady State. While the structure is similar to a First Order Drain, the behavior is
identical to Goal Seeking. By adding an inflow to the stock used in the First Order Drain
example, the drain no longer dominates the behavior but instead only determines the level
of the steady state. More specifically, an Approach to Steady State structure has a
constant input and a drain that is dependent upon the current stock level. As the stock
level gets higher, the drain pulls more from the stock. Eventually the inflow level will
equal the outflow, leaving the stock at a steady state. A more detailed causal diagram and
Virgin Behavior is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Causal Diagram and graph of Virgin Behavior for Approach to Steady State
Structure.

Lastly, Garrison Military and Garrison Mission Requirement do not demonstrate
independent Virgin Behavior. Garrison Military operates as a pool of resources for
deployment and training purposes, thus not displaying any individual characteristics.
Conversely, Garrison Mission Requirements is held at a constant for the purposes of the
model under the assumption this mission load will not decrease over the course of the
simulation period. However, it is coded as a stock for policy implementation later in this
study.

Step 2: Development of Causal Logic
Given the Virgin Behaviors of the individual stocks, a foundation is laid to iteratively
build the causal diagram showing individual influence factors in the model. The causal
diagram depicts which entities affect each other and the direction of their effect (positive
or negative). Figure 11 shows the compilation of the Virgin Behaviors previously
discussed with the exception of Expeditionary Military both Technical and Management,
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whose Goal Seeking structure will be built in the forthcoming iterative steps. (For
reference purposes, note that all stocks are labeled with bold font, circled C’s are
compensating loops, circled R’s are reinforcing loops, and starting with Figure 12 all new
components appear in red.)

Figure 11: Causal Diagram showing Virgin Behaviors of individual stocks.

The first set of influences to illustrate is the completion of the Goal Seeking structure for
Expeditionary Contractors and Expeditionary Military Technical. These two stocks are
driven by a goal of completely meeting the Total Expeditionary Mission Requirement,
which is a sum of the Expeditionary Nation Building Mission and Expeditionary Base
Operations Missions outlined previously. This requirement is then compared to the Total
Expeditionary Personnel to create a single gap that drives the increase of both contractor
and military stocks. However, the Total Expeditionary Personnel is not simply the
number assigned to that mission; those individuals are operating at a specific efficiency at
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any one time with the highest possible value of one. For example, contractors completing
a task for the first time will not perform at the highest efficiency because of a learning
curve; however, with experience that efficiency will rise. So the Total Expeditionary
Personnel, then, is the sum of the contractor and military personnel multiplied by their
respective efficiency. Note that for military the efficiency is a function of the Technical
Knowledge Base, per the previous definition. Completing the complementary Goal
Seeking structures also creates two compensating loops, discussed previously as bringing
stability to the system.

Figure 12: Causal Diagram added closing the causal Goal-Gap loops for Expeditionary
Contractors and Expeditionary Military Technical.

The next step is to identify how the Expeditionary Gap is divided between the military
and contractors. Closing the entire value of the gap on both the contractor and military
sides results in increasing personnel at a rate of double the current gap. Therefore, a

44

factor titled Contractor Preference is created in Figure 13 to compare the efficiency of
military personnel to that of contractors, thus deciding how the gap is split. If contractors
are better at performing the expeditionary mission, they will receive a higher percentage
of the gap, and thus higher increase in personnel. Conversely, if military personnel
perform the job more efficiently, the larger workload will shift to them. The total
preference of military and contractors is always equal to one, ensuring the integrity of the
gap is maintained. In the flow diagram, a time constant is also used to further detail the
increase and/or decrease in contractors and military.
The second factor introduced in Figure 13 is Expeditionary Contractor
Experience. As mentioned with the First Order Draining structure, there is a natural
atrophy of efficiency if no action is taken to maintain it. The act of maintaining
knowledge (or in this case efficiency) comes through continued practice and experience.
Therefore, as Expeditionary Contractors are being utilized, the effect of the drain on
Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency is decreased. Notice that the addition of this factor
creates two reinforcing loops (in addition to two reinforcing loops from the previous
factor). As previously discussed, reinforcing loops create instability within the system as
causal effects spiral out of control. As an example, follow the circular influence from
Expeditionary Contractor Experience that, when increased, decreases the drain on
Contractor Efficiency, which increases Contractor Preference, which increases
Expeditionary Contractors, and then further increases Expeditionary Contractor
Experience. This loop, uncontrolled, can have serious repercussions throughout the
system.
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Figure 13: Causal Diagram adding Contractor Experience and Contractor Preference.

The final influence added to the Expeditionary Military Technical is a Propensity
to Deploy in Figure 14. As the Deployment Tempo increases for military, there comes a
point where the tempo goes over sustainable measures, typically targeted at fifty percent
of personnel deployed. Therefore, as tempo nears the breakpoint the propensity
decreases. This addition provides a compensating loop to help stabilize the system;
however the second influence added in Figure 14 creates two reinforcing loops and one
compensating loop. This influence, Military Deployment Experience, works the same as
the Expeditionary Contractor Experience previously displayed in Figure 13.
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Figure 14: Causal Diagram adding Military Deployment Experience, Deployment Tempo,
and Propensity to Deploy.

The next step of iteratively building the model moves into the realm of Garrison
Military and Training Policy. The Training Policy represents the percent of garrison
military efforts that are devoted to the Expeditionary Training Program. This
Expeditionary Training Program is what builds the Technical Knowledge Base to allow
operations to continue efficiently. The compliment (one minus the Training Policy) is
then dedicated to performing the Garrison Mission Requirement. It is important to note
that the Expeditionary Training Program represents a multitude of training venues,
including formal classroom training, informal on-the-job training in garrison, and the
actual Prime BEEF (expeditionary) training program. Also introduced is the Contractor
Ratio, a simple ratio of contractors per Total Expeditionary Personnel. This provides a
baseline for the Expeditionary Work Shift, which represents how work requirements shift
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from nearly purely technical when the military is performing tasks to much more
managerial oversight when more contractors are involved. This shift in work then
determines the number of Expeditionary Military Management required for proper
oversight and quality control.
The Expeditionary Work Shift and Garrison Gap also influence the Training
Policy Goal. As the Garrison Gap grows larger, garrison civil engineer commanders
sacrifice the Expeditionary Training Program for meeting strict requirements set forth by
their leadership, with the Garrison Gap being exacerbated by decreased levels of military
personnel due to deployments. Follow the influence loop: an increased Garrison Gap
decreases the Training Policy Goal, which decreases the Training Policy, which
decreases Technical Knowledge Base, which decreases Military Efficiency, which
increases the Expeditionary Gap, which increases Expeditionary Military Technical
deployments, which decreases Garrison Military, which decreases Total Garrison
Personnel and increases the Garrison Mission Gap further; another reinforcing loop.
Similarly, an increased Expeditionary Work Shift decreases the Training Policy Goal,
which decreases the Training Policy and continues through the loop similarly until the
work shift increases further as well. These two factors combine to produce five new
reinforcing loops and only one compensating loop, as shown in Figure 15.

48

Figure 15: Causal Diagram adding Work Shift and Expeditionary Training Program.

The final step to complete the model causal diagram incorporates influence on
Garrison Military, bringing it within the system boundary (rather than an external input).
The influence is simple: as personnel are deployed to the Expeditionary Military
Technical and Expeditionary Military Management they must be removed from the
Garrison Military stock. This influence, along with the complete depiction of the
influence diagram is shown in Figure 16. The last influence added, while simple,
increases the number of reinforcing loops in the model by five to a total of nineteen,
while compensating loops are severely outnumbered at eleven. This proves the model in
question is severely unsteady and susceptible to erratic behavior, providing a baseline for
proceeding forward with the second step of the modeling process: model formulation.
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Figure 16: Causal Diagram, final model.

Step 3: Model Formulation
The process of implementing the influence diagram through flow diagram simulation is
done with System Dynamics software. STELLA® (version 9.0.2, by ISEE, Inc) is used
for this study because of its widespread acceptance among System Dynamics proponents
and immediate availability (Richmond, 2004). This section will convey the logical
development and implementation of the causal relationships into graphical
representations of systemic behavior.
Starting the model formulation process requires identifying the framework of
general requirements for the model simulation. This framework includes determining the
scenario to be simulated along with the length and time interval of the simulation.
Remaining consistent with historical trends and projections from military analysts, the
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scenario utilized for this simulation consists of a state versus non-state military
intervention rather than full scale, state on state, near-peer warfare (Barnett, 2005). This
type of warfare, typically characterized by some type of counterinsurgency, is estimated
to average ten years in duration (Nagl, 2002). This projection of warfare scenario and
duration provide the starting point for replicating real world behavior in the model.
Therefore, a sixteen year window will be used for the simulation, expressed in terms of
months, producing a simulation range of zero to 192 months. Sixteen years was chosen
to fully encompass timeframes before, after, and during the conflict simulation.
However, many of the simulations do not include a conflict end, instead focusing on
behaviors produced during the conflict. It is also important to reiterate that although the
model is formulated in terms of months it is inappropriate to analyze it in terms of the
exact timescale, but rather in terms of systemic behavior over the short, medium, and
long term horizons.
Using this framework and keeping in mind the aforementioned value of
behavioral analysis over statistical analysis, the modeling process continues by
translating the Virgin Behavior of the individual components (stocks) into flow diagrams
and incrementally connecting the elements in the same manner as previously done with
the causal diagrams. The intent is to implement each system element as an accurate
reflection of real-world behavior, ensuring all aspects are real, logical, and appropriate to
the system.
As with the causal diagram, development of the flow diagram begins with the
individual stocks and their infrastructure to demonstrate individual Virgin Behaviors.
The first stocks to operationalize are the two system inputs, the Expeditionary Nation
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Building Mission and Expeditionary Base Operations Mission. These two stocks are a
representation of current mission requirements from the technical domain, expressed in
units of personnel. As discussed in Step 2, their Virgin Behavior takes the form of an Sshaped curve where requirements first start small and begin growing more rapidly as
operations intensify, eventually slowing to some steady state level appropriate for the
given conflict. However, these two requirements differ in their inception. The
Expeditionary Base Operations Mission begins when the first combat boots hit the
ground and is generally proportional to the number of foreign personnel present.
However, the Expeditionary Nation Building Mission lags behind as the bulk of technical
engineering work cannot be accomplished satisfactorily until security has taken hold.
Furthermore, the level of requirements between the two differs as well. While military
strategists argue whether the appropriate counterinsurgency strategy consists of a Hearts
and Minds versus a Cost Benefit approach, the one overarching understanding is that
defeating a counterinsurgency requires boots on the ground (FM 3-24, 2006). To sustain
a high number of military personnel and operate expeditionary airfields requires an
increased technical engineer capacity. Figures are not available for exactly what
percentage of deploying personnel are being utilized for Nation Building versus Base
Operations, but a conservative estimate would put Nation Building around three quarters
the work load of Base Operations. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the flow diagrams for
these two stocks with the operational Virgin Behavior for the model.
(Note: all flow diagrams are color coded with stocks being black, flows being green,
converters (mathematical calculations and constants) being blue, and a few noteworthy
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mathematical representations in orange. All ghosts, or stock shadows, are represented
with the same color, albeit a lighter shade.)

Figure 17: Flow Diagram and behavior of Expeditionary Nation Building Mission
simulated in STELLA.
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Figure 18: Flow Diagram and behavior of Expeditionary Base Operations Mission
simulated in STELLA.

Moving forward with the main portion of the model, the next piece of
infrastructure to bring to life is the Technical Knowledge Base stock. Knowledge base is
gained through both formal and informal training (Expeditionary Training Program) and
retained through repetition (Deployment Experience). The Virgin Behavior’s
infrastructure was tailored to produce a steady-state Technical Knowledge Base level of
100, allowing it to be a straightforward representation of Military Efficiency. Deployment
Experience acts as the draining factor, lowering the rate with more experience and raising
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it when there is little experience. The complete flow diagram and resulting graphical
behavior is shown in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Flow Diagram and behavior of Technical Knowledge Base simulated in
STELLA.

The remaining six stocks were all identified as having a Goal Seeking structure.
For brevity, Training Policy, Garrison Civilians & Contractors, and Expeditionary
Contractors will not be discussed further, but their flow diagrams with resulting
graphical output are available in Figures 20, 21, and 22 respectively.
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Figure 20: Flow Diagram and behavior of Training Policy simulated in STELLA.
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Figure 21: Flow Diagram and behavior of Garrison Civilians & Contractors simulated
in STELLA.
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Figure 22: Flow Diagram and behavior of Expeditionary Contractors simulated in
STELLA.

The remaining stocks to focus on are Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency, Expeditionary
Military Technical, and Expeditionary Military Management. The first consists of the
typical goal seeking structure with an added first-order drain. The concept is simple.
Expeditionary Contractors are striving to reach an efficiency goal or maximum
performance level as any individual or organization would. However, because of the
previous ties of Technical Knowledge Base for military members with efficiency, there is
an assumption being made that efficiency is dependent on knowledge, which dissipates
over time. Therefore, the same draining structure utilized for the military applies here to
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contractors. The resulting combination of goal seeking infrastructure with a first-order
drain (a combination quite common in System Dynamics) is displayed in Figure 23.

Figure 23: Flow Diagram and behavior of Expeditionary Contractors Efficiency
simulated in STELLA.

In the model being presented, it is impossible to display the flow diagram for the
final two stocks individually without visually losing the implications they have on one
another. Expeditionary Military Technical and Expeditionary Military Management are
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individual stocks operating in separate goal-seeking structures, however they both draw
from a common supply of personnel, creating complex relationships between them.
Figure 24 exhibits their flow diagram with resulting behavior.

Figure 24: Flow Diagram and behavior of Expeditionary Military Technical,
Expeditionary Military Management, and Garrison Military simulated in STELLA.

The goal-gap structure for Expeditionary Military Management can be clearly
seen in the diagram presented; however, the goal-gap structure for Expeditionary Military
Technical is not immediately evident because the entities referenced are in other parts of
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the model. It is important to note the model begins with a specific number of military
personnel in-garrison; utilization of those personnel towards expeditionary tasks has a
special dynamic. If there are excess personnel, there are no problems. However, when
personnel shortages arise (which is inevitable) there must be some determining factor to
decide which mission will receive personnel and which will not: technical or
management. The priority was given to the management function. While this may not
happen in real life, the following logic supports that decision: if there is a personnel
shortage the stop-gap is the addition of more contractors, who require more oversight,
requiring more management positions. It would be suboptimizing not to take those
personnel from the technical side and move them into a management role, thus
multiplying their expeditionary impact (multiple contractors versus the individual). Of
course, this shift is not physically seen in daily expeditionary operations; however, the
slow shift of this burden has accumulated over time, especially throughout the past eight
years of combat operations in Southwest Asia. This concept of shifting work
requirements is expressed in the model as an Expeditionary Work Shift, impacting the
model in two separate areas: the Training Policy Goal (displayed in Figure 24) and
Required Expeditionary Military Management displayed in Figure 25. At its heart, the
work shift is a function of the percentage of expeditionary personnel who are contractors,
expressed as the oversight requirements on a graphical scale. This clearly impacts the
required number of Expeditionary Military Management and also indirectly influences
the Training Policy Goal. The training goal (expressed as technical training, not
managerial) can be driven down when work shifts away from technically oriented work,
having an indirect impact on Technical Knowledge Base.
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Figure 25: Flow Diagram of Training Policy displaying Expeditionary Work Shift.

A second factor influencing the Training Policy Goal is the Garrison Gap. As
high deployment tempos create shortages in garrison personnel to accomplish the
Garrison Mission Requirements, garrison squadron commanders are forced to cut or
forgo portions of the Expeditionary Training Program; a devastating impact on Technical
Knowledge Base. The remainder of the influences being operationalized from the Causal
Diagram into the Flow Diagram are unambiguous and can be seen as part of the final
Flow Diagram model displayed in Figure 26, with Table 5 listing the factors used. It is
this model that will be carried into Step 4 of the System Dynamics methodology:
simulation and validation.
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Figure 26: Flow Diagram, full model.
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Table 5: Names, values, and units of coefficients used in the Flow Diagram.
Coefficient Name

Coefficient Value

Coefficient Units

0.50
0.50
0.50
0.35
0.20
0.50
0.25
0.50
0.10
0.50
0.40
0.20

1/month
1/month
1/month
1/month
1/Person*month
1/month
1/Person*month
‐ Unitless ‐
1/month
Efficiency/Person*month
1/month
1/month

Management Deployment Flow Factor
Technical Deployment Flow Factor
Expeditionary Training Policy Flow Factor
Compounding NB Factor
Draining NB Factor
Compounding OB Factor
Draining OB Factor
Intensity Factor
Garrison Contractor Flow Factor
Knowledge Base Compounding Factor
Expeditionary Contractors Flow Factor
Contractor Efficiency Flow Factor

Step 4: Model Simulation and Validation
With the Flow Diagram complete, a final view of the resulting Technical Knowledge
Base behavior can be demonstrated. However, although Step 4 of the System Dynamics
methodology is labeled simulation, throughout Step 3 numerous intermediate simulations
where processed to aid the iterative construction of the model. Step 4, therefore, is
simply the final simulation which either confirms or refutes the hypothesis. The model
behavior for Technical Knowledge Base is shown in Figure 27, clearly representing the
Reference Mode behavior presented in Figure 1. The remaining challenge to Step 4 then
is to subject the model to validation testing and identify the characteristics of the model
infrastructure and relationships that give rise to the demonstrated Reference Mode.
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Figure 27: Technical Knowledge Base, as simulated from the final model.

With the operational model producing an accurate representation of the Reference
Mode, it is now ready to continue building confidence in the model through the validity
tests introduced in Chapter 3. Many of these tests are iterative in nature, being
accomplished throughout the modeling process (Structure Verification Test, Parameter
Verification Test, Behavior Anomaly Test, and Behavior Reproduction Test); however a
few key tests will be discussed in detail.
The first key test accomplished after the final simulation is the Extreme
Conditions Test, considered by many to be the most important validation test (Shelley,
2009). This test involves manipulating levels of stocks to which rate equations depend,
demonstrating the effect and giving insight to possible structural flaws. Throughout the
testing there were no surprises as the model reacted extremely appropriately to all stock
levels used. As an example, Training Policy is a key stock influencing the inflow of
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Technical Knowledge Base and when changed from minimum (zero training) to
maximum (only training), the resulting action on Technical Knowledge Base is exactly as
expected. Similarly, Figure 28 displays the reaction of Technical Knowledge Base to
varying levels of Total Expeditionary Requirement; again we see an appropriate resulting
behavior, increasing confidence in the accuracy of the model.

Figure 28: Technical Knowledge Base’s reaction to varying levels of Expeditionary
Mission Requirement.

The Boundary Adequacy Test was also assessed throughout model formulation and again
upon conclusion. This test looked at various entities within the model to test if their
inclusion was significant to the model’s purpose. For example, when the model was
going through a long and rigorous iteration phase the idea of incorporating turnover into
the model was introduced. After discussion and preliminary simulation it was decided
not to be included because it would aggregate the model to a level incommensurate with
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the goal of solving the Reference Mode behavior; the impact was minimal. All of the
entities included in the current model are significantly tied to the operational relationships
in the model, showing the model’s boundary is adequate and again building confidence.
The final noteworthy validity test is the Behavior Sensitivity Test, which tests
parameter values looking for levels causing behaviors to fail. The results of this test
showed impact on behavior intensity; however, the behavioral trends remained intact.
Again, the inability to find parameter values that cause major system failures builds
confidence that the model being used is valid and appropriate for the purposes of
assessing Technical Knowledge Base within the Civil Engineer career field and exploring
potential solutions to reverse the Reference Mode behavior.
The final part of Step 4 in the System Dynamics methodology identifies those
endogenous areas of the system where solutions can be implemented. The first and
obvious entity impacting Knowledge Base is the Training Policy. Because this policy
directly affects increasing Technical Knowledge Base, it can immediately be identified as
crucial to reversing current trends. Another entity identified through structure is
Expeditionary Military Management. It may not seem as evident, however there is one
pool of military personnel divided between Garrison Military, Expeditionary Military
Technical, and Expeditionary Military Management. While the first two directly impact
Expeditionary Knowledge Base, Expeditionary Military Management does not directly
influence knowledge base at all. This means military personnel residing in the
Expeditionary Military Management arena are not contributing to maintaining knowledge
base. The implications of this will be further discussed in Step 5, along with other areas
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identified by Civil Engineer career field representatives as potential solution areas, also
called leverage points.

Step 5: Policy Generation and Implementation
The following section will explore several leverage points in order to demonstrate
potential solutions to the problem of an eroding technical knowledge base. However,
first it is necessary to clarify that it is not the intention of this research to explore all of
the possible alternatives or determine the optimal solution sets. Instead the research is
interested in identifying potential solution areas and exploring some of the benefits and
detriments of those areas. Further research will be recommended in Chapter 5 to further
reinforce the findings of the model developed during this study.
However, before presenting the findings of Policy Generation, during the data
gathering process a structural flow in the model was found. The version of the model
that was being used attempted to operationalize deployments on an individual level; it
needed to be aggregated to the organizational level. The problem presented itself when
attempting to implement a Garrison Work Reduction policy that would free military
personnel from garrison obligations in favor of training and deployments. However,
Expeditionary Military Technical would not react as expected to this change. What was
happening was due to military members being on a conveyer while contractors were in a
reservoir. A reservoir is the traditional function of a stock; a supply that is increased and
decreased according to its structural in-flows and outflows. A conveyer similarly takes
inflows, however these flows are then held in the conveyer for a designated period of
time then automatically released as an out-flow. Therefore, the deployment cycle was
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not only fighting to close the Expeditionary Gap but also working to replace those
personnel coming off the conveyer (returning from deployments). This coupled with the
internal bifurcation of the gap between contractors and military created a favor towards
contractors that, over time, resulted in military falling off and contractors taking the
entire workload. See the Figure 29 for the graphical display of the military’s behavior.

Figure 29: Behavior of Expeditionary Military Technical before the correction (blue line)
and after (red line).

To further explain how this behavior is being produced mechanistically, consider
the following scenario: a gap requirement of 100 personnel is split 90% to military and
10% to contractors; met immediately it is brought to zero. However, because the military
are on a conveyor processing at two time units, those 90 personnel will flow out of the
conveyer after 2 time units and the gap which was previously eliminated is now at 90
(note that because the contractors are in a reservoir, they never decrease – or “redeploy” –
until the gap is negative). So now the gap of 90 is again split 90%/10% to military and
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contractors bringing the total to 81 military and 19 contractors. Six time units later the
entire process repeats itself changing the balance to 73 military and 27 contractors, then
65 military and 34 contractors, then 59 military and 41 contractors, and so on. In
mathematics, this is known as a limit (when a certain entity approaches a certain number
but never actually fully gets to it); the military approach zero while the contractors, in this
example, approach 100.
To correct the model, the conveyor used in the military deployment-cycle was
changed to a reservoir, a previously used outflow eliminated, and Technical Military
Deployments was made into a biflow. There were no changes made to the actual
formulations of the flows, however there was a significant change made to the behavior
of Expeditionary Military Technical as seen in Figure 29. No longer fighting against the
redeployment, this stock’s infrastructure is now free to respond to the Expeditionary Gap
alone and creates a behavior in-line with what we would expect to see (and what is
currently being seeing in Iraq and Afghanistan).
This change also had minor changes elsewhere in the model, which unfortunately
required data collections to be re-accomplished. However, through finding this
formulation error confidence can be further built that the model is valid. The two entities
affected by this change were Expeditionary Military Management and Technical
Knowledge Base. First, there was a slight decrease in the total number of Expeditionary
Military (Management) created because the Expeditionary Mission Requirement which
was formerly completed exclusively by contractors was now shared by military, who
require less oversight. The overall change (~15% decrease) is not considered significant
and the overall behavior is unchanged, which is the focus of the analysis (see Figure 30).
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Figure 30: Behavior of Expeditionary Military Management before the change (blue line)
and after (red line).

The second entity changed and most important is Technical Knowledge Base.
The changes are shown in Figure 31 and are quite acceptable, even to the point of
building more confidence. The final level of knowledge base erosion and behavioral
pattern are exactly the same; the only change is the time it takes for the steady state level
to be reached (144 months versus 80). This can be directly attributed to the higher levels
of Expeditionary Military Technical and relates perfectly to the results seen in Contractor
Policy #2 (where this error was found, to be explored shortly). In those results,
controlling the level of bifurcation of the gap between contractors and military had no
change in the final level of knowledge base, only how long it took to get there (as we see
here).
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Figure 31: Behavior of Technical Knowledge Base before the change (blue line) and after
(red line).

Though the change made here has already been incorporated throughout the entirety of
the research presented, it represents the importance of iteration throughout the System
Dynamics methodology process. Confidence is built with each iteration and leads to a
final model that can provide pathways to potential Reference Mode solutions. The
following sections identify those areas where various policies can be generated to do so.

External Training Policy
The first area to explore is the Training Policy; it has a few interesting aspects as
it stands in the model (reference Figure 26 for an illustration). First, Training Policy is
set at a steady state of .15 in the model which, if each unit follows training program
regulations, is the minimum required level (AFI 10-210, 2009). Hence, Training Policy
is the sole driver for Increasing Knowledge Base and at a level of .15 maintains that base
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at its steady state value of 100. Second, Training Policy changes as a function of the
current policy with the Training Policy Goal. This goal is a graphical function that
increases and decreases in accordance with the Expeditionary Work Shift and the
Garrison Gap (shown in Figure 32). As the Expeditionary Work Shift increases, the goal
decreases (i.e. more work is being performed in the Expeditionary Military Management
mission, hence training programs respond by shifting training to other than technical
topics). Likewise, as the Garrison Gap increases, the goal decreases (i.e. there are not
enough people to perform the garrison mission, so the training program will be sacrificed
to the immediate needs of the squadron commander). Therefore, any external policy
inserted will attempt to increase Training Policy, the key driver in maintaining
knowledge base. However, as the Expeditionary Work Shift and Garrison Gap decrease
the Expeditionary Policy Goal below the steady state (.15), this results in a competition
of the artificial policy against the endogenous causal structure.

Figure 32: Graphical Function defining Expeditionary Policy Goal as a function of
Expeditionary Work Shift and Garrison Gap.
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A variety of options are available to attempt policy intervention for the Training
Policy, but for the research here two options and their combination will be used. The first
option is a straight-forward rule bolstering of Training Policy if ever it falls below the
steady state level of .15. The policy, dubbed External Training Policy #1 consists of
using if-then logic so that whenever training drops below .15, it forces additional training
into the system commensurate with how far below .15 it currently is(formulated as:
External Training Policy = .15 - Training Policy).

Figure 33: Impact of External Training Policy #1 on Technical Knowledge Base.

The results of this policy are shown in Figure 33 with line 1 representing no
policy and line 2 representing the additional policy. Though this policy eases the loss of
knowledge base, it does not bolster it to acceptable levels; it could, however, be used later
in conjunction with other policies. What’s happening in both External Training Policy
#1 is a battle between the external policy and the Policy Goal, which is controlled by the
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Work Shift and Garrison Gap. To influence the Training Policy effectively, the influence
of these two units must be dropped to simulate a hard-line policy in maintaining current
training levels despite Garrison Mission Requirements and Expeditionary Work Shift.
This shift in thinking brings the intervention tactics to the root of the problem,
addressing multiple negative reinforcing loops. Therefore the next artificial policy,
External Training Policy #2, removes the causal influences of Expeditionary Work Shift
and the Garrison Gap altogether, setting the Training Policy at a constant level of .15
(the steady state value). This representative of career field leadership standing up to
make expeditionary training a priority investment over garrison requirements and making
an effort to remain technically oriented despite the shift in work to managerial roles in the
expeditionary environment. The results are seen in Figure 35 with trace one being no
policy, trace two being External Training Policy #1 and trace three being External
Training Policy #2.

Figure 34: Impact of External Training Policy #2 on Technical Knowledge Base.
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Additionally, Figure 35 takes External Training Policy #2 one step farther by increasing
that steady-state level for multiple simulations. In External Training Policy #3 the first
trace is no external policy at all, the second is a steady state level of .15, and the
remaining traces step that value by .05 each, finishing on trace seven with a steady state
value of .40. It is obvious that higher, unhindered levels of training does increase
knowledge base, but there are other entities involved here impacting the erosion.

Figure 35: Additional impact of External Training Policy #3 on Technical Knowledge
Base.

To summarize the External Training Policy, other than increasing training levels by
multiple factors there is no single solution to solving the knowledge base problem;
changing the Training Policy alone is not enough. However, key to allowing changes in
training requires addressing the influences of Garrison Gap and Expeditionary Work
Shift. Finally, these policies begin to point towards the chief factor creating the
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knowledge erosion: Expeditionary Military Management. These personnel are
effectively taken out of the loop of contributing to Technical Knowledge Base (either
through training in garrison or by technical experience while deployed). However, these
assignments are part of the mission requirement and therefore completely necessary; the
indications of an impasse.

Garrison Work Reduction
The second area to explore in the model is the Garrison Mission Requirement,
starting with its characteristics (reference Figure 26 for a flow diagram illustration). The
Garrison Mission Requirement is expressed in terms of a stock, though it remains static
throughout the model; this was done simply to draw attention and recognize it as a
valuable entity defining the model performance. Despite the model simulating a 12 year
time frame, there is no reason to assume the garrison requirement will change
significantly. However, the Air Force Civil Engineer in recent years has laid the
foundations for a plan to reduce the garrison physical plant (square footage of buildings)
by 20 percent by the year 2020 (Eulberg, 2008b). This Garrison Workload Reduction
initiative, then, is designed to simulate such reductions and analyze the impact of various
reduction levels.
The Garrison Mission Requirement is completed by Garrison Civilians &
Contractors and Garrison Military similar to its expeditionary counterpart. Military do
not react to Garrison Mission Requirements directly, however if the Garrison Gap grows
it cuts Expeditionary Training, which is taken off the top, freeing military personnel to
accomplish the required garrison work. Changing Garrison Contractors is a bi-flow
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which represents the plus-up and drawdown of contractors in reaction to military
deployment and redeployment. This flow is sometimes evident with temporary
contractors, but other times veiled as units simply utilize simple contractors more, such as
IDIQ (indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity), SABER (Simplified Acquisition of Base
Engineer Resources), and IMAs (Individual Mobilization Augmentee). The bi-flow does
not attempt to meet a specific target, but instead a target range defined as 80-95% of
mission requirements. Therefore, if manning drops below 80% contractors will be hired,
and conversely if it rises above 95% contractors will not be renewed (cut). Because
contracts take time, the time constant here is representatively low (.2).
Keeping these settings in mind, the first iteration of Garrison Mission Reduction
Policy consists of decreasing the Garrison Mission Requirement from zero to 35 percent
reduction in increments of 5 percent. The resulting impact on Technical Knowledge Base
is shown in Figure 36. While it is evident there are minor improvements in knowledge
base retention, the gains are not commensurate with desired performance and are only
temporary. However, there were significant changes in the level of Garrison Civilians &
Contractors used, with levels dropping sharply with increased workload reductions
(shown in Figure 37). The originally formulated bi-flow reduced Garrison Civilians &
Contractors if ever the supply of garrison forces exceeds 95 percent of the requirements.
This formulation defeats the purpose of the attempted policy, and therefore must be
reconciled. The intent of the policy is to free military members from the higher garrison
workload, allowing increased levels of technical training. Properly implemented, the
proposed policy would not allow Garrison Civilians & Contractors to decrease.
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Figure 36: Impact of Garrison Mission Reduction Policy #1 on Technical Knowledge
Base.

Figure 37: Impact of Garrison Mission Reduction Policy #1 on Garrison Civilians &
Contractors.
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To rectify this error, Garrison Mission Reduction Policy #2 did nothing more than
eliminate the 95 percent cap being imposed. The results, shown in Figure 38, display the
expected improvement from this correction. By not allowing Garrison Civilians &
Contractors to decrease (yet allowing increase if necessary), there is sufficient personnel
in-garrison to result in a zero or negative garrison gap. Because the Garrison Gap is one
of the factors driving the Training Policy, bringing the garrison workload down is crucial
to maintaining the minimum steady-state training policy. However, it should be noted
there are multiple methods for accomplishing this. For example, increasing the number
of Garrison Civilians & Contractors would also do the same. The underlying function
here is the pre-determined level of manning. As previously discussed, Garrison Civilians
& Contractors only increase when the gap is greater than 20 percent; this is a reflection
of the real-world where many bases do not receive additional military personnel until
manning is below 80 percent.

Figure 38: Impact of Garrison Mission Reduction Policy #2 on Technical Knowledge
Base.
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To summarize the Garrison Workload Reduction Policy, workload reduction
alone cannot fix the problem of Technical Knowledge Base erosion, however it does
make notable contributions toward its reversal above the 20 percent level. Similar to the
external training policy experiments, the policy efforts here focus on allowing more
training to increase knowledge base. However, there again are additional factors
significantly weighing on the erosion.

Expeditionary Contractor Policy
The next area of the model to explore is the Expeditionary Contractors. As
contractors increase, the Contractor Ratio creates the Expeditionary Work Shift which
drives the decrease in Training Policy and also is the determining factor for the level of
Expeditionary Military Management. Expeditionary Contractors are driven by the
Expeditionary Gap with Contractor Preference dictating what portion of the gap will be
met by the contractors (shown in Figure 39). There are two ways to approach the
introduction of a policy for contractors, by limiting the amount of contractors using the
Contractor Ratio or artificially weighting the Contractor Preference to largely favor
military.
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Figure 39: Graphical Function defining Contractor Preference as a function of
Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency and Military Efficiency.

For Expeditionary Contractor Policy #1, the Contractor Ratio is brought to the
Changing Expeditionary Contractor bi-flow to be used to limit contractor contribution to
50% contribution toward the mission (i.e. military must accomplish 50% or more of the
expeditionary mission). The results, seen in Figure 40, are good but have major
drawbacks. Technical Knowledge Base loss is cut significantly, however the
Expeditionary Gap rockets up to 39% of Expeditionary Mission Requirements compared
to zero before the policy introduction (Figure 41). While this policy is conceptually
sound, the results show it is unrealistic in a real world scenario; deployed commanders
simply would allow it. The Office of Management and Budget (2008) reported there are
equal numbers of contractors and military in the Iraqi and Afghan theaters, but they also
report that approximately two thirds of those work in civil engineer related fields.
Therefore, a realistic scenario for limiting contractors would probably be closer to 70 to
80 percent, which yields only minor improvements.
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Figure 40: Impact of Expeditionary Contractor Policy #1 on Technical Knowledge Base.

Figure 41: Impact of Expeditionary Contractor Policy #1 on Expeditionary Gap.

The second contractor policy focuses on the Contractor Preference, artificially
intervening to impress a military bias. Removing efficiency’s influence, in this policy
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Contractor Preference is set as a constant, varying from 100 percent of the gap to
contractors down to zero percent. The resulting behavior of Technical Knowledge Base
(Figure 42) indicates this policy has no significant impact; the only change being the
speed knowledge base eroded. The only exception when Contractor Preference is set to
zero (no contractors at all), there is significant knowledge base retention. The logic
behind this behavior lies in the value of the Expeditionary Mission Requirement and the
Propensity to Deploy for military personnel. Due to rotation requirements, military are
stopped short of deploying more than 50 percent; however, mission requirements are
higher than the number of deployable personnel. Therefore, military will remain at the
maximum operational tempo while contractors continue to increase to meet mission
requirements, albeit slower due to the lower Contractor Preference.

Figure 42: Impact of Expeditionary Contractor Policy #2 on Technical Knowledge Base.
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To summarize the Expeditionary Contractor Policy, there is no significant
advantage to implanting policy in this area. Results showed that although progress to
prevent Technical Knowledge Base erosion is possible, it comes at a significant cost to
the Expeditionary Gap, a sacrifice commanders in the field will not easily or willingly
take. However, there are unseen benefits to this policy that could supersede the costs. As
discussed in Chapter 2, issues with contractors such as cost, reliability, and knowledge
base retention are also factors with appeal on the decision. Furthermore, it is possible
this policy could perform better when coupled with other initiatives, such as the Garrison
Work Reduction.

Career Field Structure Policies
Over the years there have arisen many different suggestions for restructuring the
Air Force Civil Engineer career field or fundamentally changing the way tasks are
completed; all for the sake of improving operations to better meet current and future
mission requirements. This section is aimed at looking at some of them, many of which
will utilize combinations of policies already explored (i.e. Garrison Work Reduction,
etc.).
The first policy is Civil Engineer Civilianization, which relieves military
personnel from garrison responsibilities, giving that workload exclusively to Garrison
Civilians & Contractors (with a few exceptions). This frees military to be dedicated
solely to training purposes while in-garrison; the typical Army unit construct. There are
many variations of this proposal (Addison, 2008) which include allowing military to
perform “training projects” that not only accomplish training goals but concurrently
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contribute to the garrison workload. However, for implementation in the present model
this aspect is irrelevant because the focus (Technical Knowledge Base erosion) relies only
on the level of technical training being accomplished, not who is accomplishing the
garrison workload. Some of the strengths of this plan are increased training levels which
will boost Technical Knowledge Base production. However, the plan fails to account for
the daily maintenance aspect of the current setup; garrison military currently performs a
significant amount of installation maintenance, a crucial aspect of knowledge base that
would be lost. Additionally, this plan requires significant adjustments to civilian and
military personnel authorizations and therefore potentially significant funding.
To implement this civilianization policy, two main changes are made to the
model: Garrison Mission Completion is effectively severed from the system and
Expeditionary Training Policy is bolstered significantly. Garrison Military no longer
impact mission completion and thus likewise the Garrison Gap no longer impacts the
Expeditionary Training Policy Goal. Also, the Training Policy Goal is increased to 40
percent to appropriately reflect the new garrison mission emphasis on training; a very
conservative value. The impact of this policy on Technical Knowledge Base is shown in
Figure 43, with trace one being before implementation and trace two after. The results
show near perfect long-term retention of knowledge base, making this solution look
promising and potentially even lucrative if garrison military can achieve training levels
higher than 40 percent (which should be effortless given training as the main mission).
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Figure 43: Impact of Civil Engineer Civilianization on Technical Knowledge Base.

The second structural policy change comes from the works of Thomas Barnett, a
military strategist famous for advocating a bifurcation of lethal, high intensity military
operations (Leviathan force) from the nation building function which includes police,
engineers, and civil affairs (System Administrator force). Following a similar roadmap,
civil engineers could also be bifurcated into a technical core used for rapid deployment
and support for a Leviathan force and non-technical core focused on managing nation
building initiatives involving numerous organizations and contracted personnel. The
former would maintain that Technical Knowledge Base while the latter foregoes such
training in favor of managerial competencies such as construction management. The
strength of this proposal lies in its structure, inherently nurturing the traditional technical
knowledge while allowing transformation to occur where it is needed. The career field
already has a structure similar to this in place, RED HORSE and the Air Force Civil
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Engineer Support Agency act as the hotbed for technical knowledge while Prime BEEF
teams traditionally cover a broader range of tasks including managerial duties.
Although the Air Force Civil Engineer career field already has the natural
bifurcation of personnel, there are inherent problems preventing the full benefits from
being realized. Because the military culture includes rotating military personnel every
two to four years, those individuals containing technical knowledge from a specific
position are replace by others who may not immediately possess the same level of
expertise (knowledge base). For example, a Captain sitting in the Pavement Evaluations
section at AFCESA may hold a significant level of knowledge base; however, when that
individual must be replaced in three years the replacement rarely immediately possesses
that same knowledge base level, but rather must build it over time. It is this inefficiency
which is addressed in the second structural policy, called Career Field Bifurcation.
In the model used for Career Field Bifurcation, the Garrison Military stock is
divided into two separate pools; one for the technical mission and the other for the
management mission. This represents a specialization of the forces into these two
separate categories, utilizing the technical personnel to fulfill Expeditionary Military
Technical requirements and likewise management personnel for the Expeditionary
Military Management requirements. To accomplish the split, it was necessary to
duplicate the Propensity to Deploy and Ops Tempo so each side could operate
independently. As for the Effective Garrison Military, the technical pool does not
contribute while the management pool contributes fully (100 percent). And finally, the
Expeditionary Training Policy was set to 40 percent for the technical side and ignored for
the management side (no impact on results). Figure 44 illustrates the behavior of
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Technical Knowledge Base in reaction to this policy when split evenly. Trace one is the
original results, which is worse than the baseline performance; however there is one
important unaccounted factor. Trace one and all previous model outputs expressed
Technical Knowledge Base in terms of a collective, career field level entity. However,
because the number of personnel contributing to that level was cut in half, the pot needed
to represent knowledge base per person, vice the career field. Therefore, trace two made
this correction and demonstrates much healthier progress.

Figure 44: Impact of Career Field Bifurcation on Technical Knowledge Base.

The final change implemented was a policy allowing the deployment of civilians.
Although the Civil Engineer career field already practices this, the levels of deployments
are extremely low, especially in comparison to their civil engineer counterparts in the
Army who deploy large numbers of civilians from the Corps of Engineers. The policy
used here utilized civilians when military resources had been exhausted, effectively
adding an additional pot of personnel to draw from. The results need not be shown as
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there was no change to the value or behavior of Technical Knowledge Base from this
policy. However, each garrison civilian utilized proportionally decreased the number of
Expeditionary Contractors. Therefore, in sufficient quantities civilian deployments could
solve many of the problems posed by contractors, as discussed in Chapter 2 (i.e.
reliability, cost, flexibility, etc.).

To summarize the endeavors of Step 5 in the System Dynamics methodology,
several leverage points in the model were identified to potentially provide an avenue for
mitigating the erosion of Technical Knowledge Base. Those areas are summarized in
Table 6. Across the top are the five different variations made to the model to create the
desired policy (solution). Training Policy is used twice, once as the minimum training
level currently required by Air Force regulations (approximately 15 percent of garrison
work hours) and the second as the worst-case scenario for Expeditionary Training Policy
should the Garrison Mission Requirements be removed. Garrison Workload Reduction is
used at the 20 percent reduction level (the career field goal) and the Expeditionary
Contractor Limit is set to ensure contractors make up less than 75 percent of
expeditionary forces. The final entity, Career Field Bifurcation, splits the 70 units of
military personnel with 30 going to the technical side and 40 to the managerial side.
The vertical options listed show each of the areas identified, the possible
combinations, and the specific structural and procedural changes explored. Each is
marked to represent which policy on the horizontal axis was utilized and a numerical
measure of the steady-state value of Technical Knowledge Base displayed for comparison
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purposes. Further combinations of the structural changes with the other additional
policies were accomplished but were omitted due to insufficient effect.

Table 6: Summary of policies implemented and resulting steady-state values of Technical
Knowledge Base and Management Knowledge Base.
Garrison
Training Training
Workload
Policy
Policy
Reduction
(.15)
(.40)
(20%)
Option #1:
Do Nothing
Option #2:
Minimum Training
Option #3:
Maximum Training
Option #4:
Garrison Work
Reduction
Option #5:
Contractor Limits
Option #6:
#’s 2 & 4
Option #7:
#’s 2 & 5
Option #8:
#’s 4 & 5
Option #9:
#’s 2, 4 & 5
Option #10:
Civilianization
Option #11:
Bifurcation
Option #12:
Deploy Civilians

Exped.
Career
TKB MKB
Cont.
Field
@
@
Limit Bifurcation
t=192 t=192
(75%) (30T/40M)
49

61

60

75

99

125

52

65

56

69

60

75

X

69

86

X

X

63

78

X

X

69

86

99

125

109

142

50

63

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X*

X

X**

X

* The Garrison Workload Reduction used here is 100 percent.
** Garrison Military Technical don’t support the garrison mission.
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The results found here provide significant insight into the knowledge base
transformation. The next chapter will further discuss the findings and issues of Civil
Engineer career field knowledge sustainability. From this discussion, recommendations
can be made for potential courses of action and their associated advantages and
disadvantages. Additionally, further research areas will be proposed to follow the
progress of this research.
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V. Discussion and Conclusions

The model developed investigated the transformation of knowledge within the Air Force
Civil Engineer career field and assessed the consequences associated with that
transformation. The results provide senior career field leaders an understanding of the
causal relationships and resulting behaviors that affect future sustainability. However,
the ultimate decision must be made by those leaders, identifying the risks and judging
whether the current course is acceptable. The following discussion identifies those risks
and makes candid recommendations based on the results. However, the fundamental
assumption is the overall degradation of knowledge resulting from the transformation is
undesirable for the Civil Engineer career field.
Through the modeling process, training and experience, expeditionary
contractors, and career field structure have emerged as significant system attributes.
However, in analyzing them it is important to remember the model serves only as a
representation of the system’s behavior; it’s inappropriate to expect definitive values
from this or any other System Dynamics Model. Instead, to truly value the results
attention must be placed on understanding the system’s infrastructure through the causal
relationships, which give the model its characteristic behavior and value.

The Concept of the Technical Loop
The first issue centers on the concept of a technical loop. This loop captures how
the garrison military mission and the expeditionary technical engineering mission
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contribute positively to the technical knowledge base of the officers through training and
experience. If military personnel remain within these two missions, there is zero
degradation of technical knowledge. Yet, as the officers deploy more frequently to fill
managerial tasks, they do not gain this same technical experience (i.e. they are outside the
technical loop) which, over time, degrades the overall level of both technical and
managerial knowledge.
Under scenarios with no or relatively few expeditionary requirements, the
increased benefit of experience from performing technical tasks while deployed
outweighs the comparatively smaller losses from personnel outside the technical loop
supporting managerial tasks. However, under heavy operational demands the amount of
managerial tasks crosses a threshold, removing enough military members from the
technical loop such that normal steady state levels of technical knowledge are no longer
attainable; there are simply too many personnel removed from the technical loop. This
same concept holds true for the management side as well only in reverse. Despite this,
the gains in managerial knowledge through increased managerial expeditionary tasks
cannot be sustained because the ability to perform these roles is contingent on a strong
technical base that is no longer being groomed through technical experiences gained in
garrison or deployed settings.
The technical loop creates a starting point for addressing the knowledge
transformation issue. While experience gained reaches a maximum as the operation
tempo reaches 50%, the home station training program is an area with significant
potential to assist maintaining technical knowledge levels. This degradation could be
ameliorated by maximizing the organization’s training program, bringing the technical
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and management knowledge levels back to the original steady state levels, and actually
increasing the latter. Civil Engineer leadership has this within their control and is
currently pursuing changes to reinvigorate the expeditionary training program. For
example, a new Prime BEEF initiative was recently introduced to involve young officers
with the technical details of managing construction projects at home station (Beyers,
2010). However, as defined in chapter 4 the training program includes expeditionary
training, formal classroom training, and garrison on-the-job training; the new initiative
addresses only the first of these three, but advances in the latter two are similarly viable.
Therefore, the first major recommendation is to reshape home station training
programs to create a formalized “Technical Track”. This track could include technically
oriented assignments to organizations such as RED HORSE, the Air Force Civil Engineer
Support Agency (AFCESA), and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the
Environment (AFCEE); a formalized, standardized, and robust training regimen through
the Civil Engineer School; and the new Prime BEEF initiative. Another area is
professional licensure. Engineers in the Navy are required to attain licensure as a
Professional Engineer at around four to six years of service; it is required for promotion
to Lieutenant Commander, O-5. Instituting a similar program in the Air Force Civil
Engineer career field would not only bolster technical knowledge, but provide the
technical baseline necessary for managerial knowledge as well.

The Concept of Contractor Policy
While the training program is something that can be controlled by career field
leadership, the second discussion topic swings to the opposite side of the pendulum. The
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area of expeditionary contractor use is complex: nearly every anecdotal news story and a
comprehensive report from the Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction (2008)
show significant difficulties (regarding cost, quality, and integrity) when working with
expeditionary contractors. However, one fact is certain, the United States Department of
Defense (and military engineers specifically) cannot accomplish their mission without the
support of expeditionary contractors (GAO, 2008); the operational demand is too high,
the military capabilities are limited in scope and size, and the military organization is not
structured for such a massive undertaking as rebuilding an entire country. The National
Guard and Reserves were originally designed as a surge capacity in times of war, but as
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan extend into the ninth year regulations governing
Guard and Reserve forces restrict their continued use (Title 10 Regulations). This,
combined with a shift in attitude around the turn of the century toward a pro-government
outsourcing policy, has created the contractor reliance seen today (GAO, 2008).
Reliance on expeditionary contractors has additional risks besides knowledge
transformation. Reliability, retention, and cost are all factors weighing heavily on the
effectiveness of expeditionary contractors. While there is a lack of formal literature
specifically citing Expeditionary Contractors as unreliable, as non-combatants there
always exists the risk of hostile activities hindering performance. For example, in 2004
the government of the Philippines banned tens of thousands of foreign working citizens
from Iraq after a worker was captured by terrorists. Five years later, the Iraqi
government is still pleading for the ban to be lifted, although reports say there are more
than 6,000 Philippinos working in Iraq despite the ban (Gulf News, 2007). But the
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question exists, what would be the result if this happened on a mass scale? The risk
remains beyond the reaches of the Civil Engineer career field, but it must be managed.
One way to manage the risk is to utilize the garrison civilian workforce. By
deploying civilians the required number of contractors could be reduced, but the results
from the model demonstrate only minimal improvements. The solution also comes with
disadvantages, such as the loss of continuity at the garrison location and, if deployments
are non-voluntary, the potential to have a drop in retention of qualified civilian personnel.
However, the Air Force already deploys some personnel and further research could
explore the feasibility of increasing the program scale to that of the extensive Army
program, thereby making it effective in reducing contractors.

The Concept of Restructuring
While the first issue highlighted a concern nearly completely in the career field’s
control and the second issue is nearly completely out of its control; the area of structure
lies somewhere between. Many formal and informal proposals for Air Force Civil
Engineer structure have been made over the years (Addison, 2007; Katzer, 2002; Taylor,
1983), with a base-level reorganization implemented in 2008 (Eulberg, 2008). However,
the recent reorganization and many of the proposals fall short of the aggregation level
suggested in this model; the two aggregate structural changes explored through this
model are civilianization and bifurcation. Civilianization is the removal of military
personnel from the garrison mission while bifurcation was the separation of the career
field into technical and managerial cores. The model results showed both alternatives
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effectively reversed the overall degradation of knowledge, with bifurcation producing
results roughly ten percent better.
The recommendation from the structural simulations is to work a pseudobifurcation strategy. Civilianization and complete bifurcation as it was intended by
Barnett’s (2005) The Pentagon’s New Map: Blueprint for Action are multi-year, labor
intensive reorganizations with a complete overhaul to the strategic purpose of military
engineers. However, the “Technical Track” suggested from the technical loop concept is
a good beginning for a pseudo-bifurcation. By creating a program allowing young
officers an opportunity to focus on their technical skills, significant gains can be
accomplished throughout both technical and managerial knowledge areas.

The Concept of Personnel
The last discussion area pertains to the level of personnel. The initial knee-jerk
reaction is to increase Air Force military engineers to meet the higher demand. However,
it is important to remember that 62 percent of Air Force Civil Engineer deployments are
to augment sister services. Increasing Air Force engineers will cost more, require
increased authorizations, and result in excess personnel at the end of the conflict. An
alternative solution is to bolster the surge capacity internal to the Guard and Reserve
components. However, regulations governing their use constrain the extent to which this
may address the concern. Reserve components can only deploy twice per conflict within
a five year period (per Title 10 Regulations) and the typical counterinsurgency lasts an
average of 10 years (Nagl, 2002); military policies are incongruent with current mission
requirements. Based on this incongruence, something must be changed to align policy
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with practice. The benefit of a change such as this to the Air Force includes a reduction
in sister service support, easing contractor requirements. However, as The Air Force
Civil Engineer stated in June 2009, it’s a joint fight and we all must contribute.

Suggested Future Research
Throughout the research and System Dynamics method, the goal has been to
identify the knowledge transformation in the Air Force Civil Engineer career field and
provide information and potential solutions for career field leadership to appropriately
assess the situation and make candid decisions. However, the research cannot explore
every aspect of knowledge transformation and opened more questions about the career
field’s future. These provide opportunities for additional research to further the
understanding of this topic. One recommendation is to focus solely on the sustainability
issues associated with expeditionary contractors. The impact expeditionary contractors
have on retention, career field sustainability, and reliability is largely unknown; this is an
important topic with extensive implications. Another continuation of the research is in
the area of Civil Engineer officer development. Because the model was aggregated to the
entire officer corps, progressive development of officers throughout their career was not
included but could provide further details on how a “Technical Track” could be
implemented.

Conclusion
The Air Force Civil Engineer career field is experiencing a transformation of their
core knowledge. Extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan combined with
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unprecedented use of expeditionary contractors are shifting the roles that Civil Engineers
fill – from technical tasks towards more managerial tasks. Unfortunately, the experience
and knowledge gained through the technical tasks are the precursor to successfully
fulfilling the managerial roles. This transformation, then, results in an overall
degradation of the engineer’s knowledge base. It is up to career field leadership to
recognize this transformation and decide whether action is necessary to protect the
technical base. If so, this research presents multiple methods to counter the anticipated
technical knowledge erosion, namely through increased training programs and a
“Technical Track” to groom young officers for success as they advance to higher
organizational levels.

100

Appendix A: Equations for Flow Diagram
List of Stocks:
X1: Expeditionary Nation Building Mission
X2: Expeditionary Operating Base Mission
X3: Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency
X4: Expeditionary Contractors
X5: Expeditionary Military Technical
X6: Expeditionary Military Management
X7: Garrison Military
X8: Garrison Civilians and Contractors
X9: Expeditionary Training Policy
X10: Technical Knowledge Base

Expeditionary Nation Building Mission (X1):
X 1
 aX 1  bX 1
t
where: X1 (0) = 0.01
a = Compounding Nation Building Factor = .35
b = Draining Nation Building Factor = Graph(X1 * .2):
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Expeditionary Operating Base Mission (X2):
X 2
 aX 2  bX 2
t
where: X2 (0) = 0.5
a = Compounding Operating Base Factor = .5
b = Draining Operating Base Factor = Graph(X2 * .25):

Expeditionary Mission (Y):
Y = Total Expeditionary Requirement = a(X1 + X2)
where: a = Intensity Factor = .5

Expeditionary Contractor Efficiency (X3):
X 3
 a(1  X 3 )  bX 3
t
where: X3 (0) = 0
a = Contractor Efficiency Flow Factor = .2
b = Expeditionary Contractor Experience = Graph(X4):
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Expeditionary Contractors (X4):
X 4
 ab[Y  X 5Graph( X 10)  X 3 X 4]
t
where: X4 (0) = 0
a = Expeditionary Contractors Flow Factor = .4
b = Contractor Preference = Graph(Graph(X5) - X3):

Expeditionary Military Technical (X5):
X 5
 ab[Y  X 5Graph( X 10)  X 3 X 4]  {1  Graph[Graph( X 5)  X 3]}
t
where: X5 (0) = .1
a = Technical Deployment Flow Factor = .5
 X5  X6 
b = Propensity to Deploy = Graph 
:
 X5  X6  X7 
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Expeditionary Military Management (X6):
X 6
 a[b( X 4  X 5)  X 6]
t
where: X6 (0) = 0
a = Management Deployment Flow Factor = .5
 X4 
b = Expeditionary Work Shift = Graph 
:
 X4 X5

Garrison Military (X7):
X 7
X 
 X
  5  6 
t
t 
 t
where: X7 (0) = 70
Garrison Civilians and Contractors (X8):

IF .8b < (X8 + X7(1 - X9) < .95b, Then:

X 8 a
 a{b  [ X 8  X 7(1  X 9)]}
t

X 8b
0
t
where: X8 (0) = 120
a = Garrison Contractor Flow Factor = .1
b = Garrison Mission Requirement = 200

Else:
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Expeditionary Training Policy (X9):
X 9
 a(b  X 9)
t
where: X9 (0) = 0
a = Expeditionary Training Policy Flow Factor = .5

 X4 
b = Training Policy Goal = Graph{ [ X 8  X 7(1  X 9)]  Graph 
 }:
 X4 X5

Technical Knowledge Base (X10):
X 10
 X 7[aX 9  b(1  X 9)]  cX 10
t
where: KB(0) = 0
IKB = X7 * X9 + (1 – X9) * X7 * .2 - X10*b
a = Knowledge Base Compounding Factor = .5
b = Military Garrison Experience Factor = .2
c = Military Deployment Experience = Graph(X10):
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Appendix B: Adding Management Knowledge Base

A revision was made to the model to include Management Knowledge Base and
capture the link between technical and managerial knowledge within the engineering
context. Specifically, an element entitled Management Knowledge Base, a representation
of the core knowledge capabilities required to function in an Engineering Manager role,
was included. Similar to the Technical Knowledge Base component, the Virgin Behavior
and resulting structure is an approach to steady state. The Flow Diagram illustrating
Management Knowledge Base is shown in Figure 45.

Figure 45: Flow Diagram of Management Knowledge Base.
As shown, there are two flows increasing and decreasing Management Knowledge
Base consistent with a Garrison Training Program and deployment experience,
respectively. There is, however, an influence not included the Technical Knowledge
Base counterpart; the Technical Foundation which is a representation of the impact
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Technical Knowledge Base plays (discussed in Chapter 2). As Technical Knowledge
Base decreases, the ability to increase Management Knowledge Base, or the effectiveness
of the Garrison Training Program, is similarly decreased. Finally, the steady-state level
of Management Knowledge Base is set at a value of 100 given no Expeditionary Mission
Requirement; the same as Technical Knowledge Base.
To understand the behavior of Management Knowledge Base within the system, it
is first crucial to see and comprehend its behavior without the influence of the Technical
Foundation. Figure 46 shows that under an expeditionary load, the Work Shift that
creates a loss in Technical Knowledge Base similarly creates a gain in Management
Knowledge Base. This is logical; as the work requirement shifts from technical to
managerial, so will the experience and training, and in sum the balance of knowledge
similarly shifts. Therefore, the behavior represents a shift in the balance of knowledge.

Figure 46: Behavior of Technical and Management Knowledge Base without the
influence of Technical Foundation.
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However, once the Technical Foundation is included, a very different behavior is
perceived. Figure 47 demonstrates the once strong, increasing behavior of Management
Knowledge Base is now eroding similarly to the Technical Knowledge Base. The
explanation is simple: as Technical Knowledge Base erodes, the ability for Management
Knowledge Base to increase is hindered, resulting in simultaneous knowledge erosion.
Here lies the true threat if the Technical Knowledge Base erodes.

Figure 47: Behavior of Technical and Management Knowledge Base with the influence
of Technical Foundation.
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